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The domestic satellite (DOMSAT) industry has progressed
through many stages of development in its short history.
These stages of development are based on the ar^s of influence
that deeply effect the direction of the industry. Based on
the author's model of industry structure, conduct and per-
formance, a model of the telecommunications industry past and
present is developed. The stages of the telecommunications
industry are based on the premise that various external en-
vironmental factors played a key role in influencing the
industry as it progressed over time. Satellite communications
technology has its base in the telecommunications industry
and thus follow a similar pattern of development through four
major stages of growth that impact the DOMSAT industry struc-
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I. INTRODUCTION
A communications satellite is a very simple concept,
but simple concepts sometimes change the world.
James Martin
Communications Satellite Systems
Domestic satellite communications is a fairly new concept
in communications development technology. Less than 25 years
old/ satellites have made a tremendous impact on our lives.
Even more so than the telephone and telegraph, satellite com-
munications has brought closer together not only our society
but also the world as well. Communications/ whether it be
voice, data or facsimile, can bring the most distant of places
out of isolation through the use of satellites.
Because of the rapid advancement of satellite technology/
the satellite communications industry has experienced many
growing pains in its development. In its short life, the
domestic satellite industry has gone through several stages of
historical development. This thesis presents the development
of the domestic satellite industry from the perspective of the
technology and the external environmental factors that shaped
and molded the domestic satellite industry of today.
To better understand the importance placed on technology
and the industry's external environment. Chapter II develops
the author's model of an industry's structure, conduct and
performance that will be the basis for examining the domestic
satellite industry. Since the technology of satellite
10

communications had its background in the telecommunications
industry. Chapter III describes the evolution of the tele-
communications industry through four stages. The stages are
based on a cyclical pattern of prominent external environmen-
tal factors that dominated the industry's growth. Chapter IV
outlines the historical progress of satellite communications
technology both in the commercial and military environment.
This sets the stage for Chapter V. Chapter V traces the pro-
gression of the domestic commercial satellite industry based
on the model of the industry structure, conduct and performance
The DOMSAT industry also shows a similar cyclical pattern of
major influences that impacted the telecommunications industry.
The final stage of the DOMSAT industry looks at some of the
factors that will affect the application of satellite communi-
cations in the future— the technology transfer of satellite
communications to public service users and the introduction of
the direct broadcast satellite concept.
Satellite communications is still in its infancy. The
potential for a variety of satellite technology applications
for both private and business uses appears unlimited. However,
the direction that domestic satellite communications will
take in the future and its effects on society will depend upon
the elements that surround the industry and the forces that
seek to control the external environment of the industry.
11

II. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, CONDUCT AND
PERFORMANCE: A MODEL
In the complex world of the twentieth century, interactions
between people and the environment transcend almost every as-
pect of day to day living. As a result of progress and techno-
logical changes, organizations over the centuries have evolved
from simple structures to very complex systems containing
hundreds of variables. In the study of economics, the indus-
trial organization is one such system of interactions—inter-
actions between markets and industry.
Economists approach the study of industrial organization
through the analysis of three major concepts: industry struc-
ture, conduct and performance. Thumbing through various text-
books, it's clear that there is agreement on this approach but
disagreem.ent on the cause-effect relationship among the three
elements. What influences performance more, structure or the
industry's conduct? Does conduct effect structure? This chap-
ter deals with the discussion of industry structure, conduct
and performance. Also dealt with in this chapter is the con-
cept of industry strategy, an important factor in the discus-
sion of industry structure.
A. INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
Any discussion of industry structure must first be prefaced
by an understanding of a broader term, market structure. By
definition a market is a "closely interrelated group of sellers
12

and buyers" and a market structure refers to those character-
istics of an organization of a market that seem to exercise
a strategic influence on the nature of competition and pricing




3. Barriers to entry
Buyer/seller concentration simply refers to the number and
size distribution of buyers/sellers in the market [2] . Monopo-
lies (one seller) , oligopolies ( a few sellers) and atomistic
(many sellers) industries are examples of the varying degrees
of seller concentration that can be found in the marketplace.
Product differentiation is viewed as the extent to which
outputs (though similar) by various sellers in the market are
viewed as nonidentical by the buyers [3] . The most common
method of product differentiation today is the use of "brand"
names. The amount of money spent by companies in advertising
in an attempt to sway you over to their product is staggering.
The companies that produce "brand" name breakfast cereals are
a classic example. Walk down any supermarket aisle in America
today and one is undoubtedly faced with an aisel full of various
breakfast cereals from which to choose. There are wheat chex
and corn chex, sugar-coated and fruit-flavored cereals, cereals
in the shape of circles and others shaped like stars, nutritious
cereals that "kids like" and, of course, the cereal that is
the "breakfast of champions 1" Although all cereals are generally
13

alike, the amount of differentiation between these products
and the resulting consumer demand of one over the other influ-
ences the competitive relationship between firms as well as
their conduct and performance in the industry.
Barriers to entry refers to "the relative ease or difficulty
with which new sellers may enter the market, as determined
generally by the advantages which established sellers have
over potential entrants" [4]. The easier it is for a new firm
to enter the market, the more competitive is the industry.
Likewise, the more difficult the entry, the less competitive
the market. Since the degree of entry is based on the "compe-
titive" price of a product, entry can be measured "by the
highest price which will just fail to tempt new firms into
the industry" [5]
.
From this broad base of the market, the focus narrows in
on the industry. The "market" consists of many industries of
various types and sizes, an industry being defined as a "group
of sellers potentially in more or less direct competition with
each other. " Thus the concepts of market structure and struc-
ture of an industry are very closely related [6] . With these
definitions as a tool, a model of the industry structure can
now be formulated.
Figure 1 shows the author's working model of the market
and industry structure. In analyzing any organizaion (and an
industry is an organization) , it is crucial not only to under-
stand the actual make-up of the "structure" in determining
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forces lie outside and iininediately surround the structure.
Richard Caves, in his book American Industry: Structure, Con-
duct, Performance , uses the terms structure and environment
synonymously. In the author's model however, structure refers
to some organizational characteristics while environment con-
notes various forces which have an effect and impact on the
structure. In the industrial organization framework, environ-
ment consists of two parts: internal and external. It is the
structure of the industry (the degree of buyer and seller con-
centration, the extent of product differentiation and the
various barriers to entry) that shapes the internal environment
(a state of behavior, if you will) of an industry while the
external environment directly impacts on the structure.
The basic elements of the market structure are the same
elements in the industry structure. The degree to which firms
in an industry exhibit these elements shape the internal envir-
onment of an industry. Consequently, we can categorize various
industries not only by their outputs or services, but by their
internal environment as well. Figure 1 shows various types of
industry internal environments to include monopolies, oligopo-
lies and atomistic industries.
Industry 1 exhibits monopolistic behavior and is surrounded
by a stable internal environment which is slow to change and
offers very few surprises [7] . An industry where there is a
high buyer concentration level, high product differentiation
and relatively high barriers to entry is a product of this
environment. Industries 2 and 3 are oligopolies and atomistic
16

industries respectively. These industries could either be in
a turbulent or disturbed environment. Industries in a turbu-
lent environment are dynamic and rapidly changing and must
continually reevaluate their relationship vis-a-vis governmental
agencies, competitors, customers etc., while in a disturbed
environment industries tend to hinder opportunities of its
competitors [8]. An industry which exhibits low concentration,
low product differentiation and easy entry into the market as
elements, has all the flavor of this kind of environment. A
fierce dog-eat-dog competition exists, if you will.
Two factors that have a major impact on structure are
technology and the external environment. The reason for
separating technology from the external environment is that
technology may come from within the internal environment of
the industry or directly from another industry. The external
environment includes the laws, regulations, resources, geographic
considerations, other industries or any unpredictable forces,
etc., that have a direct bearing on the industry. The boundary
layer surrounding the industry's internal environment is flexi-
ble and undefined for a reason. Through survival instincts,
each firm in an industry, as well as the industry as a whole,
tries to shape the environment that surrounds them, or at least
attempts to control it. Firms and industries attempt to cope
with this external environment by extending the boundary layer
through various corporate actions. Such options include:
1. Diversification--diversifing into other product markets.
17

2. Vertical Integration--integrating to supply its own
raw materials
.
3. Multinational—carrying out similar activities in
other countries [9].
B. INDUSTRY CONDUCT
Market conduct refers to "the pattern of behavior that
enterprises follow in adapting or adjusting to the markets
in which they sell (or buy)" [10]. What then affects the
industry's conduct? Since the industry's conduct (or the
market conduct within the industry) "consists of a firm's poli-
cies towards its product and towards the moves made by its
rivals in that market;" conduct is essentially a behavioral
reaction resulting from the internal environment of the indus-
try structure [11] . The conduct of a monopoly is certainly
different from the conduct of an oligopoly.
When dealing with the nature of industry/market conduct,
the discussion falls on three areas of business policy:
1. Policies toward setting prices
2. Policies toward setting the quality of the product
3. Policies aimed at coercing rivals [12]
.
In a monopoly where the internal environment is fairly stable,
the monopolist's primary concern with pricing is to the extent
or level of his profit making. With high product differentia-
tion maintained in the stable environment coupled with little
or no competition from rivals, the monopolist's conduct becomes
almost routine, repetitious and, at times, inflexible in nature.
18

The attitude is one of security. Without a change in conduct
to not only meet the demands of the external environment but
also exert influence on the environment, the monopolist could
face troubled times ahead. When the FCC's 1968 Carterfone
Decision opened the doors to competition in the telecommuni-
cations (telephone) industry, AT&T did virtually nothing to
change its conduct towards competitors. Consequently, AT&T was
shocked at the surprising success by the interconnect companies
in this field. Since then, AT&T's conduct has still been slow
to change. Unless AT&T's conduct becomes attuned to the rest
of the industry, it will face serious problems in the future.
Industry conduct under an oligopoly is of a much more com-
plex nature. A firm in the industry recognizes the importance
of its price setting policies on the rest of the industry.
There is an immediate reaction by other sellers in the market
when one firm changes its prices. This interaction of sellers
in an oligopolistic market is called mutual interdependence [13]
In an oligopolistic market, the price setting policies are
very sensitive if there is low product differentiation in the
industry. Many manufacturing industries are examples of low
product differentiation. For instance, there is very little
price difference among various industrial manufacturers of
cotton goods. If one firm decided to substantially increase
his price to his customers, that firm may soon find himself
out of business as purchasers will go to another manufacturer
of the same (real or perceived) product but at a cheaper price.
19

The policies towards setting the quality of the product is
based on the level of product differentiation in the industry.
In the above example, low product differentiation results in
a limited product policy by the firm. It is limited in the
sense that it will be very similar to the other companies be-
cause all the firms have basically the same quality of product.
Since the firms in the cotton industry are putting out the
same quality product at basically the same price, an individual
firm can have a slight edge over the others by emphasizing
its service policy. For example, a firm can charge a few
pennies more for its product if it has an excellent reputation
for ontime delivery service.
The industries that have a high degree of product differ-
entiation have more flexibility in policies towards the quality
of their product. The makers of "Palm Beach" men's clothing
spend a large part of their budget on advertising the quality
of their product. Consequently with their reputation firmly
established, the firm can afford to charge a slightly higher
price based on its product quality.
The third policy area that affects industry conduct is in
policies aimed at coercing rivals. Coercive conduct by a
firm can be done in one or both of two ways: "(1) taming, weak-
ening, or eliminating existing business rivals; and (2) raising
the barriers to entry to curtail the supply of potential rivals,
Coercive conduct for the individual firm makes sense only in
oligopolistic situations" [14] . Coercive conduct can be in
20

the form of predatory price cutting and/or a price squeeze
by a vertically integrated firm [15]
.
The above discussion shows that in an oligopoly where the
environment is usually turbulent or disturbed, conduct becomes
critical. Similar to a balancing act, one wrong move in their
policy decisions towards prices, products or rivals could lead
to disaster. Because conduct, especially the pricing policy,
is crucial, the oligopolistic approach is joint profit maximi-
zation, if possible. The best avenue for accomplishing this
type of cooperative action would be for the firms to have an
agreement on principle (firms agreeing on a comprehensive plan
of action) , on details and adherence to the agreement by the
firms in the industry [16]
.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between structure and con-
duct of an industry. The conduct is primarily effected by the
internal environment and indirectly by the structure. The
conduct can have some effect on the external environment, i.e.,
the industry lobbying for more laws, increase or decrease of
regulations etc. Conduct can also have an indirect effect on
the industry structure.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY IN AN INDUSTRY
An added dimension to the study of industrial organization
is organizational strategy. In the business world of today,
one cannot overlooJc the importance placed on developing various
strategies or the implementation of strategic planning concepts
































firms as they do for the giant corporate structures. This
section deals with strategy, strategy formulation and strategy
adaptation in today's organization and its importance as a
vital part of the industry structure and conduct.
Strategy is critical in today's organizations because of
the rapidly changing environment that surrounds each organi-
zation. Managers and top executives must develop strategies
not only to cope with constant pressures and demands made on
them but also must develop strategies for the sake of the
organization's survival and future growth. If there were no
growth or no direction, the organization would soon stagnate
and succumb to its predators. As a familiar statement re-
flects, "If you don't know where you are going, any road will
take you there 1
"
What is strategy? There are many definitions of strategy
depending not only on your frame of reference but also on your
perspective as well. Alfred D. Chandler in his book Strategy
and Structure states that strategy is "the determination of
the basic long term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and
the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of re-
sources necessary for carrying out these goals" [17] . Taking
a simple straightforward definition, strategy is a plan, a
specific plan of action that is chosen to accomplish some goal
or objective. VJhat is implicit in these definitions is that
strategies/plans are developed because there is a need for
change or a need to prevent change. For some organizations,
gaining acceptance that there is a need for change (no matter
23

what the level in the organization) is the hardest battle to
win! Once need for change is recognized by the organization,
the biggest task is yet to come.
Since businesses and organizations exist in dynamic and
everchanging environments instead of a vacuum, they must respond
to that environmental change. Strategies in organizations cope
with the changes in the external environment by making changes
in their internal environment. Essentially then, strategies
and strategic planning strive to establish an equilibrium between
the environment and the organization. As Figure 3 shows, the
struggle to maintain or even reach equilibrium by an organiza-
tion through strategies is an ongoing battle. Organizations
are never in perfect equilibrium; consequently, strategies must
constantly be reevaluated to anticipate or react to sudden (or
even subtle) changes in the environment. The organization for-
mulates some strategy in an attempt to cope with that environment
in either of two ways. First, the firm may try to shape the
external environment in some way, or at least try to control
it. Firms attempt this by formulating strategies that extend
their boundary layer through vertical integration, diversifica-
tion and multinationals. Second, through the vision of one
person or a dominant coalition, an actual or perceived need for
change is identified in the organization because of various
problems or failure to accomplish an objective or goal. A
plan of action is established to make that change and produce




















the plan of action should also specify what variables in the
organization are not to be changed!
Given the above strategy concept, how does the organization
move towards the equilibrium state effectively? For many
organizations, that's the $64,000 question! Figure 4 illus-
trates the steps needed in strategy formulation [18]. What
is critical in the formulation of any strategy and one of the
most common mistakes made by many organizations in their strat-
egy formulation is the failure to understand the "present
state" of the organization, i.e., the current structure and
operating procedures of the organization. This seems like an
easy task—deceptively so. In reality, the various individual
perceptions in the organization coupled with attitudes towards,
and behaviors related to specific policies and procedures, may
reveal a total lack of consensus on just these few basic organi-
zational elements. It would behoove top management to take the
time to set the groundwork in this. state for proper input into
the strategy. The same approach should be taken for future
goals, the "where we want to be" state. A specific outline or
list of desired outcomes that a firm wants to accomplish should
be clearly stated to all concerned. Some organizational diag-
nosis must be considered for the inputs to be effective. As
the old saying goes, "Garbage in . . . garbage out!"
Given a proper starting point, one can specify the exact
areas needed for change and the consequences of the change.








O pa EhO ffl Ul

























































fail to set up this basic framework can diagnose the problems
incorrectly. With the wrong perception of the problems,
strategies will be ineffective with confusion as a result.
Also, if strategies are based on incorrect assumptions about
the external environment, inefficiencies will undoubtedly
emerge throughout the entire organization.
Since most strategies involve more than one step to reach
the desired outcome, the strategy goes through a transition
stage or process. This is the most critical area of the
strategy implementation. As an organization moves through the
various phases of transition, the strategy should be reassessed
to make sure the plan is still moving in the right direction.
On many occasions, the steps in the strategy transition period
fail to produce the desired results. The cause is usually a
misconception about the real problems involved or a confusion
of the ends and means of the strategy. A reevaluation of the
transition stages with an accurate feedback loop should lead
the organization to its desired goals. It is in this transition
process that Harry Mintzberg's "unrealized strategy" and
"emergent strategy" theory would fall [19] . Once the organi-
zation reaches its desired goal/objectives, it now becomes the
present state of the firm. The process starts over again.
Strategy formulation is then a cyclical evolution. The organi-
zation therefore, must continue this cyclical evolution in
order to adapt and come into a state of equilibrium with its
environment. It must be remembered however that following
these steps for strategy formulation does not guarantee success
28

for an organization. They are merely tools to assist an
organization in furthering its goals.
One of the processes of strategy implementation that leads
to a successful outcome involves the organization's structure.
Chandler's thesis is based on the premise that structure follows
strategy. An organization's structure whether it be central-
ized, decentralized/ function or product oriented or multi-
divisional in nature, is initially based on the firm's mission
objectives and goals. If its objectives are modified and/or
changed by some corporate strategy, then a structural change
of some sort must take place. One of the reasons why strategies
don't work is that a firm tries to "fit" a major organizational
change (i.e., changes in policy, objectives, etc.) into an old
structure. The key to an organization's long run survival
and success lies in its ability to adapt—to adapt not only
to those external demands but also to those inevitable internal
changes as well.
Turning to the synthesis of strategy and structure, Figure
5 shows the relationship between the organization's strategy
and structure and the industry's structure and conduct. An
organization in the industr^^ has its own corporate strategy
based on the external environment factors which includes worry-
ing about those "other guys" in the industry. Consider the
diagram as representative of an oligopoly. The strategy and
structure of the firms in the industry would make the industry
structure reflect a lower concentration level, little product








































monopoly. Thus the industry structure would shape the internal
environment of the industry as oligopolistic. In essence then,
the industry's internal environment is determined by the
strategy and structure of organizations in the industrial
structure. In turn, industry conduct is affected. As illus-
trated by Figure 5, the strategy and structure of an organi-
zation coupled with the structure and conduct of the industry,
is a dynamic, ever-changing process determined by the various
environments
.
What has not been discussed so far, is the strategy's effect
on the actual structural design in an organization and its
relationship (if any) to the internal environment of the
industry, i.e., its competitiveness.
Management and organizational theory generally refer to
four types of organizational structures: the centralized
functional organization, the decentralized multi-dimensional
form, the holding company and the matrix organization [20]
.
A firm in its infancy will start out very highly centralized
but loosely structured. Here, the entrepreneur will make most
of the decisions himself. As the firm expands, the entre-
preneur will begin to lose control due to some crisis and
will be forced to implement formal controls with a very cen-
tralized structure. This centralized firm however, will still
be characterized by power flowing from the top. As this func-
tionally oriented, single product firm matures and grows
through successful strategic planning, it will become decen-
tralized. Consequently, decision-making in many key areas
31

filters down to the lower levels. During this stage of the
game, many companies make a drastic change in their structure
to reflect a multi-divisional design. This is done as firms
begin to diversify into other related or unrelated product
areas. Holding companies are essentially multi-divisional in
nature but with greater autonomy and authority given at the
divisional level. The matrix structure, a fairly new concept,
is a combination of both function and product orientation.
In today's corporate industries, the trend is towards a divi-
sional form of management. As Chandler points out, as firms
get larger over time and diversify, they must decentralize.
Therefore, growth via diversification is an excellent corporate
strategy approach.
In a big multi-divisional firm, the organizational levels
may be divided into three major areas: strategic, coordinative
and operating [21] . As companies become more complex, top level
management may decide to retain only the strategic decisions
(policy formulations etc.) while delegating decision-making
relative to actual operations and coordination to the lower
levels of the organization. If organizations become geo-
graphically dispersed, then divisional managers control most
of the operating and coordinative decision-making while strate-
gic planning is still controlled by the dominant coalition in
the firm.
How does the structural design of the organization with
its characteristic decision-making levels relate to the
organization's environmental demands? It was previously
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mentioned that the external environment consists of many
factors: the political system, the social system, technology,
other firms and other industries. These factors may be
classified into three general types of environmental demands:
stable, regulated flexibility and adaptive [22] . In the stable
environment the organization is faced with familiar problems
so there is very little need for change. The firm surrounded
by a regulated flexible environment is also faced with familiar
problems but identifies a frequent need for change. A company
surrounded by the adaptive environment is confronted by many
constant challenges as it is faced with unprecedented problems
and sees a constant need for change.
It has been stated that an organization's strategy deter-
mines its structure; and the structure of the firms in the
industry shape the industry's internal environment. But is
there a direct cause-effect relationship between the firm's
structure and the industry's com.petitiveness? The contingency
theory states that "there is no best way of organizing, but
that all ways of organizing are not equally effective" [23]
.
Effectiveness here refers to the degree of economic performance
.
Studies done by Lawrence and Lorsch showed that "high performing
firms in an uncertain environment had greater decentralization
than low performers, and that in the predictable industry,
the high performer was the more centralized" [24] . Given the
relationship between the environment and types of industries
that were discussed earlier, the author concludes that firms
in an oligopolistic industry tend to perform better with a
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decentralized structure, while monopolies tend to be more
effective in a centralized structure.
Galbraith and Nathanson conclude after reviewing many
studies in this area that "competitiveness affects organi-
zational structure and process. The more a firm is decen-
tralized and formalized in a competitive environment, the
stronger the relation with economic performance" [25] . Al-
though the author is in general agreement with the above con-
tention, it is difficult to determine whether industry
competitiveness causes certain organizational structures to
emerge directly or vice versa. It's the age-old dilemma of
deciding, "Which came first? The chicken or the egg?" For
example, an oligopolistic industry may cause individual organi-
zations to decentralize their structure, but it may have been
the individual firm's long run desires (goal or strategy) to
be competitive in the first place. Consequently, it's more
appropriate to look at the relationships between industry
structure, conduct, performance and organizational strategy
and structure in terms of general characteristics or tenden-
cies between them rather than defining (or trying to define)
direct cause-effect relationships. Table 1 summarizes these
associations
.
In conclusion, some general interrelated propositions
can be made about industrial organizational analysis:
1. The analysis of the total market structure,
conduct and performance parameters is a major
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2. Norms of industry performance are related to
organizational form including structural and
behavioral variables.
3. Industry structure is not just based on the
strategy and structure of one organization, but
on interactions between all the firms in the
industry.
4. Environmental factors impact industrial structure
and are key inputs to organizational policy
formulation. These factors therefore determine
the direction of the organizational strategy and
ultimately the organizational structure.
5. Organizational strategy in essence is formulated
to achieve some desired objective/goal. The success
or failure of that organizational strategy relative
to the other firms in the industry shapes the
internal environment of the industry.
6. Organizational conduct and performance are feedback
indicators (measures of effectiveness and effi-
ciency) for an industry,
7. Feedback loops denote an open and very dynamic
system with many interrelating variables that
constantly interact.
D. INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
The first three sections of this chapter discussed the
many variables associated with an industry in understanding its
structure and conduct and the importance of strategy as a
vital part of making an industry or firm successful. But the
end result of the mcirket conduct by the various industries is
in their market performance. C^ves defines market performance
"as the appraisal of how far the economic results of an indus-
try's behavior fall short of the best possible contribution
it could make to achieving these goals" [26] . But how does
one measure an industry's behavior? Bain recommends several
criteria for measuring an industry's performance:
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1. The relative technical efficiency of production so
far as this is influenced by the scale or size of
plants and firms (relative to the most efficient)
,
and, by the extent, if any, of excess capacity.
2. The height of selling price relative to the long-
run marginal cost of production and to the long-run
average cost of production (usually about the
same as long-run marginal cost) , and the resultant
profit margin.
3. The size of industry output relative to the largest
attainable consistent with the equality of price
and long-run marginal cost.
4. The size of sales -promotion costs relative to the
costs of production.
5. The character of the product, or products, including
design, level of quality and variety.
6. The rate of progressiveness of the industry in
developing both products and techniques of pro-
duction, relative to rates which are attainable,
and also economical in view of the costs of progress.
[27]
In any analysis, however, where more than one criterion
is used to evaluate a given situation or circumstance, it can
become difficult to weight each criterion in terms of the
importance, impact or priority . The analysis of the tele-
communications industry and the domestic commercial satellite
industry performance runs into this difficulty. Because of
their relative importance in the telecommunications and domes-
tic satellite industries, a brief discussion will center on
two of the above criteria: 1) product performance and techno-
logical progress, and 2) technical efficiency. Chapters 3
and 5 will examine in more detail these criteria regarding




Product performance is "how well the firms engaged design,
determine the quality of, vary, differentiate, and progressively
improve their products—all relative to that performance in
these several regards which would achieve the best attainable
balance between buyer satisfaction and the cost of production"
[28] . Depending on the internal environment of the industry,
the dimensions of product performance may be looked at from
different perspectives. In a monopoly, products would be
difficult to grade on their quality since there would be essen-
tially no directly comparable standards. Also, the rate of
technological progress (progressive improvement) will be slow
since there are no challenges from other companies to demon-
strate that there is something better to be provided. In an
industry that exhibits an oligopolistic environment with a
high degree of product differentiation however, product per-
formance must be demonstrated by the various firms in the
industry for the very survival of those firms. Through the
use of advertising, firms are constantly exposing their pro-
duct to the public with promises of a "new, improved, better
than before" product. Besides being informative, industries
use advertising as a means of persuading the general public
of the quality of its product. With a high degree of compe-
titiveness and each firm wanting to get the jump on the next
guy, technological progress can occur at a rapid pace in an
industry. In an industry that exhibits an oligopolistic
environment with a low degree of product differentiation,
product performance would be difficult to measure.
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An industry's market performance in the area of techni-
cal efficiency refers to "how closely it approaches (or how
far it misses) the goal of supplying whatever output it pro-
duces at the minimum attainable unit cost of production"
[29]. In a monopolistic environment, determining technical
efficiency may be difficult to do. Richard W. Mayo and William
W. Wittmann, in their thesis, "The Structure, Conduct and
Performance of the United States Telecommunications Industry,"
state that examining the performance of technical efficiency
of the Bell System encounters several problems. Problems of
diversification, size and the regulatory climate hinder the
analysis of technical efficiency [30]. The degree of techni-
cal efficiency by a firm in an oligopolistic environment is
directly related to the amount of competition in the industry.
A firm in a very competitive environment must attain a very
high degree of technical efficiency or find iteself in trouble,




III. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY;
PAST AND PRESENT
The chief importance of the telephone lies in
the ways in which it has affected our lives and
the society in which we live. In explaining its
effects, however, we must always keep in mind
that the power of the telephone is not the power
of an idea, a creed or an ideology; it is the
power of science and technology to enlarge man's
life.
Bjorn Lundvall
Chairman of the Board
LM Ericsson Co.
INTELCOM 1977
The telecommunications industry as we know it today is
barely 15 years old. The world has seen such advances in
communication technology in that short time span that its
accomplishments have only been rivalled by a newer even faster
growing industry—the computer industry. In the last few
generations, the telephone became an integral part of our
lives; so much so, that what used to be a luxury item, afforda-
ble only to the rich, became a necessity for us all. It would
be "unthinkable" to conduct our daily lives without this "taken-
for-granted" form of communications. Mr. Lundvall speaks of
the importance of the telephone in society. What the tele-
phone, telegraph and other forms of communications that followed
accomplished, was to literally bring the world closer together.
From the first use of the telephone and telegraph, our society
came out of the dark ages of relative community isolation, to
a world where integration of values and cultures from all
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corners of the earth would soon become a part of our daily
lives. But as the communications industry grew, so did its
problems. Throughout these past 150 years, the telecommunica-
tions industry has had many faces, from that of a welcome and
needed public service to a too powerful monopolistic corpora-
tion that had to be broken up. This chapter discusses the
telecommunications industry both past and present in terms
of the American industry structure and conduct model.
In Chapter II the author attempted to analyze the market
structure in terms of a firm's organizational structure and
strategy in an industry, and the factors that affect an industry
as a whole. To understand the structure of any industry, it
was crucial to be keenly aware of the major forces that lie
outside and immediately surround the structure. Those forces
were technology and the external environment, i.e., the politi-
cal system, the socio-economic system, other firms in the
industry and other industries. It is from this technology
and external environment perspective that the basic development
of the telecommunications industry will be presented.
The telecommunications industry has essentially progressed
through four stages based on the factors that had the most in-
fluence in shaping/changing the industry to its present day
form. Since history itself follows a cyclical pattern, so
too does the history of the telecommunications industry.
Figure 6 shows the relationship of that cycle to relative time-























































































































































telecoiranunications industry in terms of historical dates and
the political decision-making system. The following is a
discussion of each stage in the growth of the industry.
The mid 19th century saw America changing from an agrarian
society to an industrial nation. It was the time of many
innovations and technological creativity. Inventions became
an American pastime. Indeed, it was also the coming of the
business civilization. Along with the "spread of the railroad
networks in the 1850s, the triumph of Northern capitalism over
the Southern plantation system in the 18 60s, the rise of in-
vestment banking and the process of rapid capital formation
in the 1870s," came the invention of the telegraph and the
telephone [31] . Thus the telegraph and telephone became the
basic technology that was the beginning of the communications
industry. At first, the telegraph aroused little passion from
the public leading towards private ownership development. The
two decades that followed saw the emergence of the Western Union
Telegraph Co. and the entry of government regulation into the
industry. Western Union was firmly on its way when the tele-
phone came into existence, thereby ushering in not only a new
concept in telecommunications but a whole new dimension in
industry development.
A. STAGE I: 1876-1909 (Figure 8)
The late 19th century was the era of big business and the
"robber barons." This period has been described by many as




































influence of Marx's Theory of Capitalism and the "drive to
industrial maturity" characterized the period where our society
effectively applied the scope of technology to the bulk of
its resources. There was a high disparity in wealth and power
that accompanied the process of industrialization. It was a
time when huge corporations displaced the independent entre-
preneurs. The growth of the telegraph and telephone companies
fit this mold. Both areas expanded rapidly through vertical
and horizontal integration. When the Postal Telegraph Company,
a subsidiary of the Commercial Cable Co., bought out the inde-
pendents, it came into strong competition with the Western Union
Telegraph Company (WU) . The American Bell Telephone Company
had reorganized several times within a few short years after
the introduction of the telephone until AT&T finally emerged
in 1885 as a wholly owned subsidiary of American Bell. The
strategies of both WU and AT&T had been to expand separately
with a philosophy of non-interference. The growth of these
two companies (monopolies in their own right) was thus in a
fairly stable internal environment. The president of AT&T
had developed a "philosophy espousing AT&T as the single national
monopolistic telephonic and telegraph communications system"
[32]. However, by the turn of the century, the winds had
started to shift. The expected expiration of the Bell patents
saw an influx of independent telephone companies into the indus-
try. AT&T not only maintained its hold on the telephone indus-
try (through foresight and skilled maneuvering) , but made a
move to acquire the control of Western Union.
46

The four years of the merger (1909-1913) was a transition
state for the telecommunications industry. The merger was
viewed by many as making AT&T too powerful. "AT&T was on its
way towards the single national system it wanted" [33] . With
the merger came the beginning of a long line of increased
government investigations, regulations, etc. The strategies
and policies of the telecommunications industry now shifted to
meet the challenges from a different environment—the political
arena
.
B. STAGE II: 1913-WW II (Figure 9)
The 1913 "Kingsbury Commitment" was the beginning of a
flurry of moves and counter-moves by the government to keep
AT&T in line. WW I and the Depression contributed to the power
growth of the government in this stage. With the mood of the
country as one of anti-trust, AT&T's biggest competitor became
the government. This relationship led to a change in AT&T's
corporate policy to strategies that were based on a power
struggle with the government. The men of AT&T "are men of
power not because of their great fortunes or talents but because
they have powerful instruments at their command" [34]. With
the tremendous amount of resources at their disposal, both AT&T
and the government kept each other in check up to WW II,
C. STAGE III: POST WW II-MID 1970 'S (Figure 10)
After WW II, the telecommunications industry entered into
its next stage. A stage where other firms emerged to challenge

















































satellite as new medias of transmission, led to new interpreta-
tion of communications regulations. (Chapter IV is an in-depth
look at the historical development of the satellite industry
and Chapter V will cover the analysis of the domestic commer-
cial satellite industry.) While facing the challenge on this
new front, AT&T was also busy fighting the 1949 anti-trust suit
which attempted to break up AT&T and open the door to more com-
petition in the industry. The Consent Decree of 1956 however,
left AT&T's structure intact but also barred the company from
entering any non-regulated market. The "Above 890" decision,
the 19 64 MCI dispute, the FCC investigations and the 19 68 Carter-
fone decision were the first major signs of change in the external
environment in this stage of the telecommunications industry.
The stable, non-competitive environment that safely surrounded
AT&T for so long was gradually moving into a turbulent, compe-
titive atmosphere. But through the 19 60s and into the 1970s,
AT&T continued its same monopolistic strategy, doing virtually
nothing to change its conduct towards industrial competitors
and the changed external environment. The 1970s brought no
relief in sight for AT&T as the telecommunications industry
moved into yet another stage.
D. STAGE IV: MID 1970 ' S-1980 ' S (Figure 11)
AT&T ran into nothing but trouble in the 1970s.
It started with the FCC ' s Specialized Common Carrier
Decision of 1971, then followed, in rapid succession,
the Domestic Satellite Decision (which limited AT&T's
domestic satellite activities) , the Packet Communi-




























networks) , Resale and Sharing (which prevented AT&T
from giving bulk discounts to large users of its
services) , and Execunet (which resulted in AT&T
being forced to offer local loop interconnection
to its competitors). [35]
AT&T suffered another blow in 1980 in its anti-trust suit
loss to MCI. Although AT&T immediately appealed the verdict,
it may be years before a final decision is reached.
Despite the competition biting at AT&T's heels, the major
driving influence from the external environment for this
stage came from technology of another industry—the computer
industry. With the computer being propelled by advances in
mini-micro computer technology, the boundary layer between com-
munications and data processing became muddled and unclear.
A confrontation between the two superpowers, AT&T and IBM, was
inevitable. In 1974, IBM formed a subsidiary to buy the inter-
ests in the Lockheed Aircraft Co. and MCI Communications Corp.
in a domestic communications satellite venture that the two
companies had formed with the COMSAT Corporation. This aggres-
sive move by IBM brought an industry-to-industry confrontation
even closer between regulated AT&T and competitive IBM. How-
ever, the decisions that accelerated the telecommunications in-
dustry's thrust into the transition period were the Computer
Inquiry I and the most recent Computer Inquiry II.
In this bold move (the Final Decision in Computer
Inquiry II) , the FCC abandoned its attempts at
distinction between, and separate treatment of,
telecommunications and data processing. These
two functions, in the past viewed as separate
disciplines and markets, are relentlessly merging
and emerging within a single information manage-
ment marketplace. [3 6]
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The telecommunications industry has gone through four
stages of development based on the environmental factors that
played key roles in its development. The strategy taken by
the industry giants to control the environment eventually led
to the transition into the next stage. The telecommunications
industry has gone through the full cycle. It's interesting to
note here that it was technology that introduced the industry
and it appears that it may be technology from another industry
that will create a "new" industry with telecommunications as
its basis.
AT&T successfully adapted its strategy to meet the environ-
mental demands in the first two stages. Besides several internal
structure reorganizations, its strategy changed from non-inter-
ference with WU to acquiring WU, then to finally dealing with
the government as a competitor. In stage three and four, where
AT&T's internal environment was seriously threatened by the
competition (other firms and other industries) , its strategies
faltered. In the future, AT&T must attune itself to a strategy
of marketing if it is to survive in the new competitive environ-
ment against IBM and the data processing market.
1. Telecommunications Industry Performance
The telecommunications industry is presently in a
state of flux. Never before in its history has the telecommuni-
cations industry been in such a dynamic and turbulent environ-
ment. With the opening of its doors to the competitive world,
AT&T is fighting for its very survival to maintain its hold
as a dominant superpower in the telecommunications industry.
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with AT&T losing ground in each anti-trust suit, IBM took the
opportunity to seek growth in a market it now considered to
be fair territory, the market of teleprocessing and information
processing products.
These advances in technology however, are not the only
causes of AT&T's problems.
The phone companies . . . are locked into rigid
regulatory accounting procedures that assume next
year's revenues are as sure as tommorrow's sunrise.
Dedicated to supplying high quality but rigidly
standardized telephone service, AT&T managers, who
have almost universally risen through operating,
engineering, and financial ranks, are not attuned
to marketing and innovations. [37]
In contrast, however, IBM's management strategy is geared towards
marketing and its practices are more tuned for change and
surprises.
In the non-competitive, monopolistic, pre-Carterfone
era, there were essentially no standards by which product per-
formance could be measured for the Bell System. Since legisla-
tive policy and FCC regulations kept AT&T as a provider of a
public service at a reasonable cost, AT&T was seen as providing
a "good" product. Even the FCC concluded that the telephone
service was not only good, but that the U.S. telephone system
was the finest in the world. Since 1968 and the introduction
of competition, subscribers now had other products to compare
with the Bell System.
For the first time, comparison between Bell Telephone
Laboratory (BTL) /Western Electric equipment and non-
Bell equipment could be made with products being
evaluated on their price, their quality, their cost
and their merit . . . [38]
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One of the three major areas that the FCC uses to
analyze the various telecoimnunications products is switching
[39]. At a recent 34th Annual AFCEA Convention, Mr. Seifert,
the Director of Corporate Product Planning of Western Electric,
points to the improved performance of the Bell System switching
networks as a result of:
Productivity and service response gains through
extensive deployment of computerized (software-based)
operations support (OS) systems; and the accelerating
use of digital equipment in all portions of the
ne twork . [40]
One final comment is necessary in this area. The performance
of an industry can and does effect the organization's structure
as this author's model indicates. Mr. Seifert comments:
In addition to the service and expense productivity
improvements realized from these systems, their
deployment has had a significant impact upon the
structure of the Bell System operation work force.
[41]
To understand technological progressiveness in the Bell
System, one must look at Bell Telephone Laboratories—the re-
search and development arm of the Bell System [42] . Once
again, at the same panel discussion on switched networks at
the AFCEA convention, Mr. Tom Powers, the Executive Director
of Network Planning for BTL emphasizes their performance and
teclinological progressiveness;
With our existing Dataphone Digital Service we are
providing point-to-point digital capability to an
ever increasing market. Our ACS project will pro-
vide an intelligent packet switching service using
basic digital facilities . . . Within a few years,
we will be able to provide end-to-end switched cir-
cuits which our customers can use for either digital
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voice or data under their control. These circuits
will blend our new technology with our old . . . [43]
AT&T's concern for "high marks" in product performance
and technological progressiveness is also related to the threat
from the computer industry, IBM in particular. At stake is
the so-called Office of the Future— "and which industry will
supply the communicating typewriters, data-retrieval displays,
and telephones with pushbuttons that double as calculators
and as computer output and display devices" [44] . As the
telecommunications industry and computer industry merge into
the "new" information management market, the corporation that
proves itself capable and efficient in the area of product
performance and technological progressiveness will undoubtedly
command the new industry.
The emergence of a new industry, with telecommunica-
tions as its basis, will also show a change in the major influ-
ence on the industry from the environment. Given the cyclical
trend, soci-economical factors will again play an important
part in industry structure, conduct and performance. Some
of these signs are evident today. Conservation of energy,
ecology, anti-nuclear power, ERA, Equal Employment Opportunity,
the draft registration, genetics, solar heating, MBO, Organi-
zational Development, the fight against inflation, etc., etc.,
are just some of the concerns our society is faced with today.
In the near future, if not already, these concepts will shift
our emphasis until all these values become a part of our
society's social consciousness. Bell's "reach out and touch
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someone" family-oriented advertising theme and IBM's focus
on increasing the performance of other businesses through
their computer systems, are indicators of the change in market
strategy towards different social values. Clearly, the
environmental factors will have a profound impact on industry
performance as well as structure and conduct.
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IV. HISTORY OF SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT
A. EARLY BACKGROUND
An 'artificial satellite' at the correct distance
from the earth would make one revolution every 24
hours: i.e., it would remain stationary above
the same spot and would be within optical range
of nearly half the earth's surface. Three repeater
stations, 120 degrees apart in the correct orbit,
could give television and microwave coverage to
the entire planet.
Arthur C. Clarke
Wireless World , 1945
In October 1957 a small spherical object about the size
of a beachball was circling the earth once every 96 minutes
and traveling at a speed of 18,000 mph. This satellite, which
emitted a beeping sound as it orbited the globe, ushered in
the Space Age. An era of space age technology had arrived
and with it, a race between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to put
a man on the moon. The advent of the Soviet's SPUTNIK I in
October of 1957 had astounded U.S. intelligence even though
the Russians had made no secret of their satellites [45]
.
With America's reputation as a leader in scientific and techno-
logical achievement threatened, the U.S. was determined to
get back in the race.
Shortly after the launch of SPUTNIK I, the U.S. followed
with EXPLORER I in January 1958. Later that same year, the
U.S. Army launched the world's first active communications
satellite—Project SCORE. Although SCORE primarily tested
boost capability of the Atlas rocket, it also evaluated the
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first orbital communications transceiver [46] . The next
satellite to follow in 1959 was COURIER. A direct descendent
of the SCORE satellite, COURIER retained some of the basic
characteristics of SCORE but was much more complex. COURIER
was unique in that it was the first satellite to use solar
energy for primary power with batteries as the backup [47]
.
"COURIER demonstrated the capacity to inject an artificial
satellite into an earth orbit, remain operational for an extended
period due to its solar panels, and facilitate the transmission
and reception of data between two remote sites" [48]. By the
early 1960 's the space program was well established with NASA
being responsible for most of the satellite R&D experiments.
RELAY, which amplified and relayed signals and NASA's TELSTAR
satellite, an active circuit type of communication satellite
were launched in 1962.
1. Geo-synchronous Satellites
The next stage in satellite development was geo-synch-
ronous satellites. Geo-synchronous satellites are satellites
that are in orbit over the equator at such a distance that they
appear to be stationary in the sky relative to the earth.
NASA showed the feasibility of using geo-stationary satellites
by successfully launching SYNCOM into synchronous orbit in
1963.
Prior to the demonstration of SYNCOM II in 196 3 there
was concern expressed by prestigious communications
organizations that the 260 millisecond time delay
inherent in communications via synchronous satellite
would be unacceptable to telephone users. Although
early experiments with simulated time delays were
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conducted, a demonstration of a working satellite was
necessary to convince skeptics of the superiority of
synchronous satellites. [49]
"Since SYNCOM, about 80 geo-synchronous satellites
have been launched. Of these, 72 are communications satellites
Sixty-four were built and launched by the United States, 50
for operational rather than experimental use" [50]
.
B. COMMERCIAL SATELLITES
The Communications Satellite Act, passed by Congress in
1962 formulated our national policy concerning satellites.
Its purpose was
to establish, in conjunction and in cooperation with
other countries, as expeditiously as practicable, a
commercial communications satellite system, as part
of an improved global communications network, which
will be responsive to public needs and national
objectives, which will serve the communication needs
of the United States and other countries, and which
will contribute to world peace and understanding. [51]
The Communications Satellite Act formally established the
Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) as the United
States' participant in the development of an international
satellite system. COMSAT is considered a congressionally
chartered private corporation. The Congress authorized COMSAT
to offer international communications 'satellite services
throughout the 1960's. COMSAT is able to offer communications
services between the United States and foreign countries,






In April of 1965 the world's first commercial satellite,
EARLY BIRD, was successfully launced from Cape Kennedy. With
its advanced technology, the EARLY BIRD (INTELSAT I) satellite
made live transoceanic television possible for the first time.
The EARLY BIRD satellite was the first in a series of satellites
launched by the INTELSAT organization. The satellites that
soon followed were being designed with increased capacity to
handle more communications traffic demands and longer design
lives.
The INTELSAT organization was created in August 1964.
INTELSAT is an organization that was formed to develop, imple-
ment, and operate the space segment of the global system. The
INTELSAT agreements are founded on the basic principle that
the satellites utilized in the global system should
be jointly financed and owned on the widest possible
international basis, and that the extent of each
participant's financial investment and ownership's
share should be related as closely as possible to
its potential use of the system. [52]
The space segment of INTELSAT is owned by the 105
members of the consortium. The individual ownership percen-
tages are adjusted annually to reflect their relative current
usage of the system and as new members join the organization.
Fiugre 12 pictorially describes the normal INTELSAT financial
arrangements which reflect the following steps in the cash,
flow process.
1. Each signatory contributes new capital invest-
ment, based on its ownership percentages, monthly
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2. INTELSAT invests such funds temporarily and
then periodically makes payments for spacecraft
equipment, launch services, and R&D contractors.
3. Each signatory or designated telecommunications
entity (in countries that are not parties to
the agreement) that uses the system pays
utilization charges quarterly on the basis of
a tariff schedule prescribed by INTELSAT for
various types of services.
4. INTELSAT retains, from the revenues received,
funds for current operating and maintenance
expenses of its own organization and distributes
the balance of the revenues to signatories on
the basis of their ownership. The revenue
distribution covers both a repayment of capital,
consistent with the amortization recorded in
the accounts, and compensation for use of
capital. [53]
Throughout the 1960's, the INTELSAT organization experi-
enced rapid growth and development. The EARLY BIRD satellite
was followed by three more generations of satellites—INTELSAT
II in 1967, INTELSAT III in 1968 and INTELSAT IV in 1971.
Each of the satellite series had more advanced technology and
greater communication capacity than its predecessor. INTELSAT
II built by the Hughes Aircraft Corp. had the capability for
multipoint communications and extended satellite coverage over
most of the world. INTELSAT II consisted of two satellites,
one over the Pacific and the other positioned over the Atlan-
tic. The INTELSAT III satellites which established the global
system, had the capability for simultaneous transmission of
television, telephone, telex, data and facsimile. This series
had satellites positioned over the Atlantic, Pacific and the
Indian Oceans for complete world coverage. The INTELSAT IV
series was designed to meet global system requirements for
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the early 1970 's. Although the INTELSAT IV series' major
accomplishment over its predecessors was its "spot beam"
transmitting antennas, its capacity for the first time was
limited by available bandwidth and not by available power
[54] . The current INTELSAT V is due to be launched in the
1980-1981 time frame. It has global, zone and spot beams to
supply different communications capabilities to different
regions and it also uses the 11/14 GHz bands as well as the
4/6 GHz bands [55] . Table 2 gives the characteristics of the
INTELSAT satellites.
To illustrate how much communications traffic has
increased since EARLY BIRD, COMSAT cites the following
statistics:
1. In 1971, COMSAT was leasing 5,315 half-circuits
full time to its U.S. communications carrier
customers, compared to 66 in 1965. CA half-
circuit is one end of a two-way communications
link.)
2. At the end of 1977, 9 6 countries, territories,
or possessions, were full-time users of
satellite services with COMSAT, as opposed
to 13 in 1965. [56]
2 . Canadian TELESAT
Canada has established its own satellite system for
domestic communications purpose. Their ANIK satellite was
launched in November 1972 and established Canada as the first
nation to use geostationary satellites for domestic communi-
cations. The coverage of the ANIK satellite extends from the
East Coast to the West Coast and from the United States border
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operation transmitting to over 70 manned and unmanned earth
stations. The satellite is of the basic design developed by
Hughes Aircraft and consequently this same design has been
adopted by Western Union for their satellite development.
Each satellite has twelve transponders each of which can be
used for 480 duplex voice channels or one color television
channel. The major customers served by this satellite are
the Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (TV) , Trans-Canada Telephone
System, and the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railways
[57].
C. U.S. DOMESTIC SATELLITES
In 1965 the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) requested
permission from the FCC to launch a satellite system for tele-
vision distribution within the U.S. The FCC requested comments
from interested parties on ABC's proposal and by December of
1966, three other proposals had been filed by the Ford Founda-
tion, COMSAT Corp. and AT&T for domestic satellite systems.
During the 1968-1969 timeframe, the President's Task Force on
Communication Policy recommended a cautious approach to the
development of satellite communications but favored the proposal
set down by COMSAT. In 1970, the Administration outlined an
"open entry" policy towards domestic satellite communications.
This policy essentially stated any organization technically
and financially qualified would be eligible to provide domestic
satellite communications services. By 1972, the FCC in its
Second Report and Order of June 19 72 had approved the beginning
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of domestic satellite communications for the United
States.
1. COMSAT General Satellites
The COMSAT General Corporation was established
in 19 73 by COMSAT as its wholly owned subsidiary to carry
out programs not related to the INTELSAT system. These pro-
grams included the COMSTAR and the MARISAT systems.
The COMSTAR satellites are the first to be integrated
within the nation's telephone network. Providing service to
the contigious 48 states, the satellites are leased by AT&T
and GT&E for domestic communications. "Employing advanced
techniques, each of the four delivered satellites can relay
over 18,0 00 two-way telephone calls simultaneously, has a
7-year design life, is 20 feet high, and weighs 3,348 pounds
at launch" [58]
.
The MARISAT satellite system is the first commercial
satellite for use by merchant ships for ship to shore communi-
cations. MARISAT provides such capabilities as data and tele-
phone communications between merchant vessels and shore estab-
lishments. What makes this system unique over previous mari-
time communications is that MARISAT is essentially unaffected
by either weather or ionospheric conditions. Thus MARISAT
can provide fast and dependable communications around the
clock. The MARISAT system has three satellites that are
positioned over the Atlantic, Pacific and the Indian Oceans.
In addition to providing maritime service, MARISAT
has designated channels for use by the Navy. Termed the
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"GAPFILLER" satellite, the Navy leased services from MARISAT
for an interim period of time until the Navy's FLTSATCOM was
operational.
2. Western Union Satellites
In 1974 Western Union launched WESTAR I and WESTAR II,
the first U.S. domestic satellites. With primary coverage
consisting of the 48 contiguous states, Hawaii and Puerto
RicO/ the WESTAR was designed to provide more communications
flexibility and less cost for private communications systems.
As a result, a price war developed for long distance leased
communication channels in the United States. Using the
WESTAR satellite a leased telephone circuit from coast to
coast was less than half the cost of similar channels from the
terrestrial common carriers [59] . Using dedicated earth sta-
tions, the WESTAR has become an integral part of the Western
Union network providing such services as telex, TWX, Central
Telephone Bureau, telegrams, data and facsimile in addition to
point-to-point or point-to-multi-point video service . The
WESTAR satellites have transponders (36 MHz bandwidth) which
may be used to carry any of the following:
1. One color television channel with program sound.
2. 12 00 voice channels.
3. A data rate of 50 Mb/s.
4. The center 24 MHz of each band may relay either
a. 16 channels of 1.544 Mb/s or
b. 400 channels of 64,000 b/s or




RCA was the first to provide domestic satellite ser-
vice for the United States. RCA accomplished this in 1973 by
leasing channel capacity from Canada's TELESAT system using
the ANIK II satellite. RCA continued to lease transponders
on the WESTAR satellite in 19 74 and finally launched its own
satellite, SATCOM, in 1975. Designed to provide voice, tele-
vision and high speed data communications, RCA's three SATCOM
satellites each have a 24 transponder capacity. SATCOM can
simultaneously handle 24,000 one-way telephone messages or 24
color T.V. programs, weighs 2000 pounds and has an 8-year
design life [61]. These satellites are authorized to provide
service to all 50 states plus Puerto Rico. Similar to WESTAR,
SATCOM satellites can provide private line common carrier
service to all areas they serve. The service includes T.V.
distribution to Alaska, private line and dial service within
Alaska and between Alaska and the rest of the United States,
private-line video, voice and data to government agencies






The American Satellite Corporation (ASC) which is
jointly owned by Fairchild Industries and Continental Tele-
phone had originally planned a three phase program beginning
with a lease of transponders from Canada's ANIK II bird
followed by a launching of their own satellites in 1975 and
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1976. However, ASC made some drastic changes in their overall
system planning. ASC now leases transponders from the WESTAR
satellite. Although they do not have satellites of their own,
ASC has approximately 40 earth stations installed. Special-
izing in providing voice and data communications to 5 and 11
meter earth stations, "American Satellite's implementation of
small earth station technology was responsible for the land-
mark 1978 FCC decision allowing the transmission of data from
5 meter earth station antennas" [62]. Commissioner Joseph R.
Fogarty issued the following statement at that time: "This
is precisely the type of innovation which the Commission had
in mind when we promoted competitive offering of domestic
terrestrial and satellite services" [63]
.
5. Satellite Business Systems
In November of 1980, Satellite Business Systems (SBS)
launched their first satellite; five years after they had
filed with the FCC for approval to construct a domestic sat-
ellite system to provide private line networks. SBS, a part-
nership among wholly-owned subsidiaries of COMSAT General
Corp. , IBM and Aetna Life and Casualty Company is planning a
second launch in April of 1981. The SBS satellite system
offers the following features:
1. Use of the 12 and 14 GHz bands
2. All digital transmission
3. Integrated voice, data and image services
4. 5 and 7 meter earth station antennas located in
most cases at the customers' premises
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5. Minimum dependence on terrestrial interconnections
6. Centralized system management facilities
7. Facilities to enable customers to dynamically
control and manage the use of their network. [69]
With its current state-of-the-art technology, SBS will be the
first commercial satellite carrier to provide high
capacity, private communications networks for
business and government users having large volume
communication requirements among geographically
dispersed facilities. The networks will be fully
switchable and provide users with a full range
of communication services. . . [65]
D. MILITARY SATELLITE PROGRAMS
The passage of the Communications Satellite Act of 19 62
recognized the possibility that all the various requirements
could not be satisfied by one system. Section 102(d) of that
Act states "It is not the intent of Congress by this Act. . .
to preclude the creation of additional communication satellite
systems, if required to meet unique governmental needs or if
otherwise required in the national interest." For several
years afterwards, the policy of DOD concerning the use of its
own government system was left in limbo. In 1965, hearings
by the Subcommittee of Military Operations stated, "The DOD,
after long and fruitless negotiations with COMSAT, now has
decided to proceed with the development of a separate communi-
cations satellite system to fulfill urgent government require-
ments" [66] . There are some obvious differences between a
system designed strictly for military purposes and one designed
for a competitive commercial market. One major difference is
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in the security and survivability requirements of a military
system. Some distinctive military requirements are:
1. Positive operational control
2. Mobility and remote area access
3. Protection against physical attack
4. Protection against electronic countermeasures
5. Low capacity and secret message transmission
6. Separate frequencies for military use. [67]
Generally speaking, increasing the measures of any of these
requirements tends to drive up the system cost. A point to
be made here is that since not all user requirements have a
need for all the above features, it is not necessary to
satisfy all DOD requirements using strictly military communi-
cation satellites. Although Congress has stated that there
will be separate military and commercial systems, an issue
that is constantly arising is selecting which of the existing
communications satellite systems should be used to satisfy
specific user requirements. This issue is beyond the scope
of this thesis and the ensuing discussion of DOD satellite
programs will be focused on military satellite systemiS.
1. Early DOD Satellite Programs
One of the earliest developments by the Department of
Defense in the area of satellite communications was the Ini-
tial Defense Communications Satellite Program (IDCSP) system
in 1962. This program was the follow up to the first experi-
mental use of satellites for military communications. "The
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main objective of IDCSP (aside from its experimental purpose)
was to provide an emergency capability for supplementing the
Defense Communications System and to improve its provision of
minimum communications for military command and control purposes"
[68]. During the Vietnam War, IDCSP, the first semi-operational
SHF system was used for voice and data communications.
After the earlier Defense programs were developed,
two distinct paths of military satellite communications evolved
—
a strategic (SHF) point-to-point system and a tactical (UHF)
satellite system [69]. Whereas strategic communications uses
large fixed antenna sites ashore, tactical satellites were
specifically designed to operate with shipboard, airborne and
land-mobile terminals [70] . The DSCS satellite falls under
the strategic system while the Lincoln Experimental Satellites
(LES) , TACSAT, and GAPFILLER are classified as tactical sys-
tems. The FLTSATCOM meets the Navy's needs in both the strate-
gic and tactical arena.
In October of 1965, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) directed the establishment of a Tri-Service
TACSATCOM R&D Program. This decision led to the development
of three R&D satellites; LES-5, LES-6 and TACSAT which were
launched in 1967, 1968, 1969 respectively. The LES satellites
evaluated the utility of using communications satellites to
satisfy tactical requirements and proved that UHF (around 300
MHz) communications is possible with earth terminals having
relatively simple wide-beam width antennas [71] . The Tactical
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Satellite (TACSAT) function was to provide communications
between various mobile units including ships and aircraft.
The TACSAT proved that it was possible to have an operational
system that was feasible for tactical communications. The
lessons learned and the knowledge gained from these early
systems were incorporated into the concept of a Fleet Satellite
Communications System (FLTSATCOM) . But because of numerous
delays in the acquisition and production cycle coupled with
technical difficulties for this system, it was necessary to
acquire a system to provide satellite communications to fill
the gap between the TACSATCOM and the FLTSATCOM. This was
accomplished through the GAPFILLER satellite.
2. GAPFILLER Satellites
The GAPFILLER program was implemented in 19 73 in order
to provide interim UHF satellite communications service to
the Department of Defense because of the FLTSATCOM program
delay. In 1973 the Navy awarded- a contract to the COMSAT
General Corporation to provide for the lease of a two satellite
UHF service. This satellite also provides service to commer-
cial maritime users under the name of the MARISAT system, dis-
cussed previously. The GAPFILLER provides two narrowband
(25 KHz) and one v;ideband (500 KHz) channels. There are three
GAPFILLER satellites positioned over the Atlantic, Pacific
and the Indian Oceans
.
3. FLTSATCOM Satellites
The FLTSATCOM program was conceived because the Navy
recognized the inherent weakness of HF Beyond Line of Sight
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(BLOS) communications. FLTSATCOM was to provide the "24 hour
all-weather availability, high capacity and low error rate
needed to support modern communications command and control
requirements" [72] . The mission of the FLTSATCOM spacecraft
is "to provide reliable, worldwide communications relay links
(except near polar regions) between ships and aircraft of the
fleet and selected fleet ground stations, and between Air
Force aircraft and air/ground terminals" [73]
.
The design of the FLTSATCOM is considered extremely
sophisticated in comparison with other communications sat-
ellites. For example, FLTSATCOM design stresses overall
"hardening" to enhance survival chances in orbit in case of
nuclear attack. FLTSATCOM 's many subsystems include the
following
:
1. Fleet Satellite Broadcast (FSB)
2. Naval Modular Automated Communications Systems (NAVMACS)
3. Secure Voice Communications System (SVCS)
4. Information Exchange Subsystems (IXS)
:
a. CUDIXS (Common User Digital IXS)
b. SSIXS (Submarine Satellite IXS)
c. ASWIXS (Anti-submarine Warfare IXS)
d. TADIXS (Tactical Data IXS)
e. TACINTEL (Tactical Intelligence IXS)
A description of the various FLTSATCOM subsystems is not within
the scope of this thesis. Table 3 gives the characteristics
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Because of the increased costs and delays associated
with the FLTSATCOM, Congress has become interested in other
methods of obtaining satellite capability besides through the
development/procurement method. It had already been demon-
strated through the MARISAT (GAPFILLER) program that a leased
satellite service could be obtained at a reasonable and com-
petitive price. In 1977, following hearings before the House
Committee on Appropriations, the Committee reported that the
Navy should begin leasing satellite services rather than pur-
chase additional satellites. The Navy argued against the
recommendation stating that "long-term leases constrained its
ability to take advantage of changes in technology, hybrid
systems compromised use and control of satellites, and leases
are generally more expensive than outright purchase" [74].
Based on its own investigation and study, the House Committee
recommended that
Henceforth, DoD should, in the committee's view,
lease not buy communications satellites. The
reason for the Committee's conclusion was that it
found a picture of persistent problems extending
over many years and over many programs. Delays
and cost overruns are common in these programs.
Thip is in contrast to commercial communications
satellites which have a superior record . . .
One of the primary findings of the study is that,
in contrast to the commercial world, the DOD
tries to take a few relatively large and revo-
lutionary steps in obtaining communication
satellites, whereas the commercial world takes
smaller incremental steps with lower degrees
of technical risk and hence lower risks in
regard to both cost and schedule. [75]
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The U.S. Navy, designated as the Executive Service for this
project, contracted for the LEi^A* services from Hughes Com-
munications Service in late 1978. The Hughes contract calls
for five years of service from four satellites. Each sat-
ellite will provide 13 discrete communications channels using
nine transmitters as follows:
1. A Fleet Satellite Broadcast (FSB) channel
employing SHF uplink on-board processing,
with UHF narrowband downlink
2. A 5 00 KHz wideband channel at UHF
3. Six 25 KHz narrowband channels at UHF, each
using a separate downlink transmitter
4. Five 5 KHz narrowband channels at UHF, all
sharing a single downlink transmitter at
predetermined power levels. [76]
Although LEASAT is a follow on to FLTSATCOM, the LEASAT offers
some advanced capabilities not found on FLTSATCOM. Table 4




The major operational DOD satellite communications
system is the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)
.
The DSCS I satellite was placed in operation in 19 67 and
orginally utilized nearly-synchronous satellites. In 1974
the "Phase II" DSCS satellites were declared operational in
both the Atlantic and Pacific areas. As a strategic satellite
system, the DSCS II provides long haul communications for
the NMCC (National Military Command Center) . Within the

















































the DSCS II is designed to supply high capacity, reliable,
independent communications capability in support of peace-
time operations as well as contingency and wartime operations
[77]. Through the 1980's, the next phase of the DSCS program,
DSCS III, will provide SHF communications with global cover-
age for the Department of Defense. This series of satellites
is expected to have substantial improvements in the area of
survivability, reliability and flexibility.
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V. THE DOMESTIC COMMERCIAL SATELLITE INDUSTRY: A MODEL
This nation has traditionally followed a policy of
conducting international telephone, telegraph and
other communication services through private enter-
prise subject to governmental control, licensing
and regulation. We have achieved communication
facilities second to none among nations of the
world. Accordingly, the Government should aggessively
encourage private enterprise in the establishment




The launching of the world's first communication satellite
in 1958 added another significant dimension to the growth of
the telecommunications industry. A new technology was intro-
duced that would have a profound impact not only on the tele-
communications industry but on the entire world as well. What
was not anticipated by most however, was the rapid growth and
development of satellite communications into many areas of our
society in just over two decades. From the initial "beep" of
the signal from space in 1957, our society has progressed to
the point where direct home satellite reception for the majority
is just around the corner. Figure 13 reflects the development
of the satellite industry in an historical perspective as
discussed in Chapter IV.
Comparable to the development of the telecommunications
industry, the domestic commercial satellite industry follows







































































on factors that help shape the industry. Because of the rapid
advances in satellite technology, the industry moved through
the same stages of. influence in 2 years as did the telecommuni-
cations industry in 15 years. The stages of the domestic
communications satellite industry are:
1. Stage I: 1958-1972 (Political influence)
2. Stage II: 1972-Mid 1970 's (Other firms' influence)
3. Stage III: Mid 1970 ' s-1980 ' s (Other industries' influence)
4. Stage IV: 1980's-2000 (Socio-economic influence)
Figure 14 shows the relationship of the domestic satellite
industry to the telecommxonications industry.
A. STAGE I: 1958-1972 (Figure 15)
The Communications Act of 19 34 established the Federal
Communications Commission as an independent regulatory agency
for the purpose of "regulating interstate and foreign commerce
in communication by wire and radio so as to make available,
so far as possible, to all people of the United States a rapid,
efficient, nation-wide and worldwide wire and radio communica-
tion service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges"
[78] , With the introduction of satellite technology, new issues
were raised that would not be satisfactorily answered by the
1934 Act. Questions of competition, ownership, operation,
markets and boundaries were being addressed by various inter-
est groups who saw the potential of satellite communications
for the future [79]. But despite the implication of President





































































policy guidance and legislation in the early 19 60 's prevented
competition in the domestic satellite (DOMSAT) industry for
at least another decade.
In the summer of 1961 President Kennedy outlined his policy
for U.S. leadership in satellite communications that would lead
to global coverage and universal benefit. The heart of his
new policy was "private ownership and operation of the U.S.
portion of the system, joined with certain public interest
requirements and objectives" [80] . Other critical points of
the policy guidelines included:
1. Foreign countries would be invited to participate
through ownership or otherwise.
2. Communications carriers would have access on an
equitable and non -discriminatory basis.
3. Effective competition would be sought in the
purchase of system equipment, and measures taken
to prevent narrow ownership and monopoly control.
4. All satellite launchings in the United States
would be under the control of the government, which
would also undertake to assure effective use of the
radio frequency spectrum. [81]
In the year that followed, heated debates took place in
Congress over the question of ownership. There were three
proposals introduced in Congress concerning ownership [82].
The first by Senator Kerr of Oklahoma called for the creation
of a communications satellite corporation which would be entirely
owned by U.S. communications common carriers. The second was
a White House proposal that was in effect a compromise between
private and public ownership and the third proposal by Senator
Kefauver, called for an entirely government-owned satellite
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system which would not be dominated by the commercial common
carriers
.
The dominant communications common carriers were generally
opposed to the "private ownership by non-carriers" proposal.
AT&T's Vice President James E. Dingman in testimony before
the Senate concluded that although satellite communications
was not really a major breakthrough and essentially had no
practical domestic application, the carriers would help
advance satellite communications [83] . He stated:
This position may be construed by some as stemming
from the selfish interests of my company which is
the largest of all carriers involved. Let me
assure you that it is not.
Let one thing be crystal clear: AT&T has no desire
or intention of seeking to control the communica-
tions satellite system to its competitive advan-
tage . . . Hard as it may be for some to under-
stand, our sole interest is in the earliest
practicable establishment of a world-wide commer-
cial satellite system useful to all international
communications carriers and agencies both here
and abroad [84]
.
1. The Communications Satellite Act of 1962
When the dust settled and the debates concluded, it
was the White House proposal that was adopted. It was in
August of 19 62 that President Kennedy signed into law the
Communications Satellite Act of 1962. This act created the
Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) which was to
carry out the following functions:
1. Plan, initiate, construct, own, manage, and
operate, iteself or in conjunction with foreign




2. Furnish, for hire, channels of communication of
United States communications common carriers and
to other authorized entities, foreign and domes-
tic; and
3. Own and separate satellite terminal stations when
licensed. [85]
The Act of 1962 essentially states that COMSAT will operate as
a "carrier's carrier" in the global satellite communications
system. It can provide transmission services only to the
authorized common carriers and not to the general public.
Since COMSAT is a congressionally chartered private corpora-
tion. Congress made provisions for common carriers to own up
to 50% of COMSAT'S Board of Directors while the other 50% was
issued to the general public. Also, only COMSAT or COMSAT in
conjunction with foreign governments may own the satellite of
the international communications satellite system. In effect,
this Act stifled and delayed competition in the DOMSAT indus-
try for many years.
The history of satellite regulation in the following
years showed that federal regulation stunted even further the
growth of satellite communications. Just four years after the
passage of the COMSAT Act of 1962, the FCC eroded the powers
of COMSAT in international communications
.
First, with its earth station decision, the FCC
removed COMSAT control over a major portion of
the system. Then, with its authorized user
policy, the Commission prevented COMSAT from
selling channels directly to CBS, Associated
Press, UPI, the Washington Post, Eastern Air-
lines and a host of other companies that wanted
to send information via satellite instead of




2. FCC Docket No. 16495
The use of domestic satellites was first proposed to
the FCC in September 19 65 when ABC filed an application for
a domestic satellite to distribute program material to its
affiliated television broadcast stations. The Commission
noted that their application raised some interesting legal
questions and therefore issued a Notice of Inquiry in March
1966, Docket No. 16495
—
In the Matter of the Establishment of
Domestic Noncommon Carrier Communications Satellite Facilities
by Non-Government Entities ,
Of all the responses made to the Inquiry, the Ford
Foundation proposal brought the questions about a domestic
satellite system to the forefront of public discussion and
government decision [87] . The key issue brought on by their
reply to Docket No. 16495 centered on whether the Communications
Act of 1934 or the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 is
the exclusive Act concerning domestic satellite communications.
Table 5 summarizes the legal position of AT&T, COMSAT, Western
Union, Ford Foundation and ABC concerning the applicability
of both these laws.
Following extensive hearings and pleadings over the
next four years, the FCC adoped on March 20, 1970 its First
Report and Order which is summarized below:
1. Unlike the international sphere, where COMSAT
is the only provider of satellite service to
the U.S., multiple suppliers of satellite ser-
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2. there was no legal basis for COMSAT to be the
sole supplier of domestic satellite services,
but neither was COMSAT precluded from the
domestic sphere;
3. the establishment of multiple domestic satellite
systems was compatible with our obligation to
INTELSAT; and
4. applications would be accepted from any quali-
fied entities pursuant to the requirements set
forth in the order. [88].
With a shift in attitude and policy towards domestic
satellite communications, the Office of Telecommunications
Policy (OTP) also recommended that any financially and tech-
nically qualified entity should be allowed to operate domestic
satellite facilities. By 1971, the FCC was formulating its
"Open Skies" policy. A policy that by 1972 would change the
entire complexion of the DOMSAT industry.
Throughout Stage I of the domestic satellite develop-
ment, the political influence and regulatory constraints in
the external environment had severely hampered the growth of
domestic satellites. Between the legislative decisions and
the FCC rulings, satellite communications remained an integral
but small part of the telecommunications industry.
The political and regulatory constraints placed on the
domestic satellite development in Stage I can be looked at from
another perspective as well. The telecommunications industry
with AT&T at the controls was starting to shift towards a
more competitive environment starting with the "Above 89 0"
Decision in 1959 and culminating in the 19 68 Carterfone Decision
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since competition itself didn't enter the telecommunications
industry until the end of the 1960 's, there was no reason to
believe that the government would have blessed a completely
competitive environment in the domestic satellite development
at the onset—a trend that would have been contrary to the
telecommunications industry development.
AT&T also had a reason for wanting tight controls on
satellite technology. During the 1950 's the transoceanic
submarine telephone cable was perfected with hundreds of times
more capacity than telegraph cables and the ability to provide
high quality communications [89]. With AT&T's investments in
and the dramatic growth of the submarine cable, AT&T and other
carriers felt threatened by the intrusion of satellite tech-
nology into their territory and the potential for a better
and cheaper means of communications. Consequently, the common
carriers had "assumed a variety of positions designed to neutra-
lize and minimize the effects of communications satellites on
established markets" [90]. On the side of AT&T was the govern-
ment. As with shortwave radio, telegraph cables and telephone
cables,
new developments in communication technology fre-
quently affect the economic viability of previous
communication modes, but governmental action or
regulation frequently intervene to prevent any
major financial losses to the communication enti-
ties which may be involved. [91]
B. STAGE II: 1972-MID 1970 'S (Figure 16)
In response to the March 1970 FCC Report and Order and














relating to procurement policies and the appropriate initial
role of AT&T in domestic satellites, eight applications for
DOMSAT systems were filed. The applicants were:
1. The Western Union Telegraph Co. (Western Union)
2. Hughes Aircraft Co. and four telephone operating
companies of GTE Service Corporation. (Hughes/GTE)
3. Western Te le-Communication s , Inc. (WTCI)
4. RCA Global Communications Inc. and RCA Alaska
Communications, Inc. (RCA GLOBCOM/RCA ALASCOM)
5. Communications Satellite Corp. and American Tele-




7. MCI Lockheed Satellite Corp. (MCI Lockheed)
8. Fairchild Industries, Inc. (Fairchild) [92]
The next year and a half saw a flurry of proposals,
deliberations, hearings and rebuttals by the eight applicants
and the FCC on the exact nature and form that the domestic
satellite service should take. Finally on December 27, 1972,
the Commission released its Final Report. The Commission
stated that its broad domestic satellite policy objectives
were as follows:
1. To maximize the opportunities for the early
acquisition of technical, operational and
marketing data and experience in the use of
this technology as a new communications
resource for all types of service;
2. to afford a reasonable opportunity for multiple
entities to demonstrate how any operational and
economic characteristics peculiar to the
satellite technology can be used to provide
existing and new specialized services more




3. to facilitate the efficient development of this
new resource by removing or neutralizing existing
institutional restraints or inhibitions; and
4. to retain leeway and flexibility in our policy
making with respect to the use of satellite
technology for domestic communications so as
to make such adjustments therein as future
experience and circumstances may dictate. [93]
This Final Report also placed some restrictions on COMSAT and
AT&T. For COMSAT to be eligible to participate in DOMSAT
ventures, it was required to form a separate corporate sub-
sidiary; AT&T was limited to using DOMSAT for its noncompeti-
tive services but would be allowed to openly compete in both
competitive and noncompetitive markets after three years [94]
.
1. The Emerging DOMSAT Industry
Under a policy of open entry during the formative
years of the industry, the most important factors governing
the structure of the DOMSAT industry were the nature and struc-
ture of current and latent markets served by satellite communi-
cations, the nature of satellite communications services and
their cost [95] . The emerging DOMSAT market structure stemmed
from the structure of the telecommunications industry—
a
natural monopoly under AT&T. The markets that AT&T supplied
naturally were conditioned by a history of monopoly-supplied
services 2uid, as a result, would take a few years for suppliers
to enter the market on a competitive basis. While AT&T had
the market for the long haul transmission business in the
U.S. with COMSAT as the supplier of its satellite services,
the smaller market sectors looked to other areas and other
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suppliers to meet their needs. Since AT&T was kept out of the
competitive markets for satellite services for several years,
it gave the smaller companies such as GTE, WU and RCA a chance
to develop their market strategies and efforts towards latent
markets. Some of the services included in the latent markets
are program distribution to CATV (Cable TV) systems and a
broader variety of leased line services for business and govern-
ment users [96] . It will be in these markets that competition
among firms in the industry for satellite services will be
the strongest by the end of the 19 70 's.
While the hearings and debates were ongoing at the
FCC on the question of a domestic satellite policy, the Office
of Telecommunications Policy (OTP) was concerned with what
form the future DOMSAT industry structure would take. OTP
commissioned several studies to be done on the technology and
economics of domestic satellite communications. The Stanford
Research Institute's study on the "Economic Viability of the
Proposed United States Communications Satellite Systems" was
to examine the potential outcome of an open entry policy.
Tables 6 and 7 reflect the results of the study relative to
the potential structure of the DOMSAT industry through the
1970 's based on the FCC applications for satellite services
by the eight corporations.
2. Growth of the DOMSAT Industry
Within three years of the "Open Skies" Policy, the















Assured market for proposed capacity.
Coexist with other applicants, mimmum
oanpetiticn interaction.
High probability of establishing proposed
system soon.
Seek monopoly authorization by FCC.
No assured markets.
Proposed capacity too large for viable
co-existence with other applications.
Very low probability that both systems would
be established; joint undertaking unlikely.
Must sell substantial excess capacity in
corpetitive market.
Assured current demand too small for initial
viability with proposed capacity, or with
capacity of smallest efficient satellite
system—two satellites, 12 transponders each.
Willing to conpete in pluralistic industry
structure
.
Will conpete for broadcast network market;
winner must invest in additicnal earth
stations, but vrould have advantage in
leased-line market.
High probability that at least one firm will
establish a system socn; joint undertaking
of two or three firms is likely; second
system possible; lew probability of more
than two systems total fran group.
Source: Stanford Research Institute, "Economic Viability of
the Proposed Qiited States Conmunications Satellite















72 transponders in 3 satellites, totaling $145
million investment.
5 major transmit-receive stations in New York, Los
Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and Atlanta, totaling $65
million investment.
24 transponders in 2 satellites, totaling $35 million
investment.
2 major transmit-receive stations in New York and
Los Angeles, totaling $10 million investment, and
video-distribution receive-only stations in
numerous (probably less than 100) CATV market
areas, each at about $0.1 million investment.
4 major transmit-receive stations at Philadelphia,
Los Angeles, Cincinnati, and Tampa, totaling about
$26 million investmoit.
24, 36, 48, 72, or 96 transponders in 2 or 3
satellites, totaling $50 million to $140 million
investment
.
2 major transmit-receive stations in New York and
Los Angeles, plus lesser transmit-receive stations
in 27 other cities, plus receive-only stations in
122 other cities, perhaps totaling $100-$125
million investment, including terrestrial inter-
connections .
May be same as network carrier or separate, depending
upon network carrier's actions and capabilities in
leased-line market.
24, 36, 48, 72, or 96 transponders in 2 or 3 satel-
lites, totaling $50 million to $140 million investmait.
Transmit-receive earth stations in at least 12 and
perhaps more than 29 principal U.S. cities, totaling
$15 million to $90 million.
Source: Stanford Research Institute, "Economic Viability of the





accomplishments. There were three operational DOMSAT systems
providing a wide range of services to domestic users: the
WESTAR, SATCOM and COMSTAR systems. AT&T and GT&E were in
the initial stage of providing satellite services within the
message toll system, and significant price reductions were
achieved by the satellite carriers that would prove to be
substantially profitable for the satellite communications
marketplace and the major communications users [97] . With the
satellite technology firmly established and as the major firms
moved towards the second generation of satellites, the empha-
sis was now placed on product identification (differentiation)
and market segmentation of the various and unique products
that could be offered by the satellite carriers. Some of the
possible services were Alternate Voice Wideband Data, Alternate
Voice-Video, On -Call Broadcast or Video Conferencing [98] . It
became clear that a strong, aggressive marketing strategy was
needed by the satellite carriers and the satellite equipment
suppliers to remain as a viable contender in their competitive
environment.
RCA with its SATCOM Program prided itself on the fact
that its system was one of the most cost effective DOMSAT sys-
tems in the U.S. In the beginning, by choosing a new approach
to system operation, leasing channel capacity vs. constructing
their own satellites, RCA was the first to provide domestic
satellite services for the U.S. To help reduce the cost of
the space segment of their own satellite in 1975, RCA looked
to a new approach that would provide high reliability, low
99

cost communications. Through an extensive and exhaustive
project, RCA modified the launch vehicle and used a satellite
that combined high capacity with low weight [99] . This
matching of the spacecraft and launch vehicle was considered
a significant cost advantage that represented a major step
forward for commercial satellite ventures in the future.
The American Satellite Corporation took a strong lead
in the industry by directing its efforts to serving government
communications users. By aggressively seeking the government
communications market, ASC took advantage of some of the pri-
mary advantages of satellite transmission, that is, the excep-
tionally wide bandwidth available in domestic satellites and
the versatility of low cost transportable earth stations which
can be moved to the customers' premises [100]. ASC's strategy
called for the continuing expansion of both their commercial
and government user networks as the function of the demand of
the marketplace. It was hoped that with the cooperation of
the terrestrial carriers, an ASC government user could also
access locations served by the growing ASC commercial networks,
It was because of the early development of their government
network that the American Satellite Corporation concentrated
on two general communications markets:
1. The common carrier communications market. This
market is characterized by large, fixed earth
stations which are connected via microwave routes
to a major central office downtown in each of
the served metropolitan areas served by ASC.
2. The second general market is characterized by the
small transportable, dedicated earth stations such
as those used by ASC's government networks. [101]
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Thus the "Open Skies" Policy thrust the domestic
satellite industry into its second stage. This stage lasted
only several years until the initial DOMSAT systems were
launched and operational. It was in Stage II where the challenge
was met by companies to get in on the ground level of a new
and better technology that would drastically improve the
quality of communications. The introduction of competition
into the DOMSAT industry in 19 72 not only shifted the forces
of influence in the external environment of the industry but
widened the gap between the telecommunications and DOMSAT
industry. The DOMSAT industry was now established as a fast
growing but separate industry from the telecommunications
industry. As it grew in the mid 1970 's, the DOMSAT industry
was becoming a vital part of the external environmental fac-
tors that impacted on the structure of the telecommunications
industry. (See Figure 10.)
C. STAGE III: MID 1970 ' S-1980 ' s (Figure 17)
The mid to late 1970 's saw even more dramatic changes in
both the growth and technology of communications . New pro-
ducts in consumer-oriented equipment and technical innovations
in transmission methods affected both the means and economics
of communications. While the DOMSAT industry was off and
running by 1976, the telecommunications industry was having
its problems. As stated previously in Chapter III, the tele-
communications industry's regulated monopolies, AT&T and GTE,





















noncompetitive. Through the 1970 's, the FCC ' s ruling in the
Specialized Common Carrier Decision, the Domestic Satellite
Decision, the Packet Communications Inc. Decision, Resale and
Sharing and the Execunet Decision resulted in a rapid change
of the external environment from noncompetitive to one of a
competitive nature. Besides worrying about the effects of
the FCC decisions, the telecommunications industry saw an
even bigger threat to its monopolistic environment—the DOMSAT
industry. In the third stage of the DOMSAT industry, the
capabilities and functions offered by the various satellite
corporations threatened to come into direct competition with
the established common carriers. Services such as TV, radio
broadcasting and telephone networks could now be provided
through the use of satellites.
One specific area that competed directly with satellites
concerned the submarine cables. Earlier in this chapter, it
was stated that government regulations frequently intervene
to prevent any major financial losses to the communication
entities as a result of new communications technology. This
is evident in the use of submarine cables over satellites for
providing international communications. Submarine cables are
still being laid despite the fact the cost per circuit is far
lower with satellites than with cables. Cable proponents
argue that the satellite delay time of a quarter of a second
is serious enough to warrant continuation of the cable; and
the added military security that comes from having more than
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one transmission medium is another reason [102]. Therefore,
lobbying takes place by both the satellite and submarine cable
groups to ensure their vested interests. James Martin in
his book Future Developments in Telecommunications , stated
that one INTELSAT IVA satellite could handle all the traffic
across the Atlantic, yet the FCC continues to authorize new
trans-Atlantic cables of higher cost. The FCC then "insists
that the public should be charged the same whether their call
goes on the expensive cable circuit or the cheap satellite
circuit" [103].
Satellites could drop the cost of international calls
to a small fraction of their present cost. With
the large satellites ahead, this prospect is likely.
However, if satellites are forced to compete with
cable on a 50-50 basis, the user benefit will not
materialize. [104]
While satellite communications were not advancing as
rapidly on the international scene, the domestic satellite
industry was making big strides on the home front. The same
industry that had a major impact on the telecommunications
industry's Stage IV had a similar impact on the DOMSAT indus-
try's Stage III—the computer industry.
1. The Computer Industry Impact
The impact of the computer industry on satellite
communications had its start back in the late 1960 's. It was
evident then that domestic satellites could solve a lot of
problems and provide enormous service to the computer industry,
Before addressing the computer and satellite relationship, it
104

is important to understand the development of the computer/
data processing industry relative to the telecommunications
industry.
In 1966, the FCC in its Docket No. 16979, Regulatory
and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Com-
puter and Communication Services and Facilities initiated the
Computer Inquiry to determine whether public computing ser-
vices should be regulated. The questions posed by the Computer
Inquiry
and the subsequent responses and replies ranged
from consideration of the current and future trends
relating to the computer and information pro-
cessing industry; to the adequacy of existing
legislation to deal with such trends; to the need
for new measures 'to protect the privacy and
proprietary nature of data . . . transmitted
over communications facilities . . .' [105]
There was a fine line drawn between communications and data
processing and it would not be until 197 3 that the categories
would be defined with the termination of Computer Inquiry I.
The following services involving computers and communications
were defined:
1. Local data processing
2. Remote access data processing
3. Hybrid data processing
4. Hybrid communications
5. Message switching (and packet switching)
6. Pure telecommunications. [106]
Essentially, Computer Inquiry I prohibited major providers of
communications services from offering data processing services.
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Figure 18 shows the range of services defined by the FCC
computer inquiry final decision.
From the conclusion of that inquiry the FCC would be
constantly faced with many more issues that would inevitably
result in the merger of the computer and communications indus-
try. "Also, decreasing computation costs, in conjunction with
the fact that voice telephone lines have only limited capacity
to handle data, would make any superior alternative communica-
tions system, like a domestic satellite, a welcome addition in
the computer world" [107]
.
In July 19 74, the computer industry took a giant step
forward to removing the boundary layer between the competitive
computer industry and the regulated telecommunications indus-
try via entry into the DOMSAT industry. IBM announced that it
would form a subsidiary to buy the interests of Lockheed Air-
craft Corp. and MCI Communications Corp. in a domestic communi-
cations satellite venture that the two companies had formed
with the COMSAT Corporation [108]. It was envisioned that
once formed, the new corporation would compete with telephone
companies for long-distance data, graphic, and perhaps even
voice communications traffic [109]. Satellite Business Sys-
tems (SBS) had been founded as a result of the FCC ' s decision
regarding the proper role of both COMSAT and IBM in the domes-
tic satellite area.
After MCI and Lockheed withdrew from the venture,
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FCC's approval of changes in the CML (COMSAT, MCI, Lockheed)
corporate structure. Under their proposed change, COMSAT
General would acquire 4 5% and IBM would acquire 55% of the
CML stock and voting control. In February 19 75, the FCC issued
a Memorandum Opinion and Order which disapproved the petition,
but described three alternative circumstances under which
applications for entry by COMSAT General and IBM would be
considered [110]. The three alternative circumstances for
application were:
1. Independent Entry Option
IBM and COMSAT to enter independently of each





COMSAT and IBM to merge but only with another
partner (s), such that no participant would have
greater than 49% or less than 10% stock ownership.
3. Lease Option
COMSAT to provide IBM a space segment and to
function only as a carrier's carrier, unable to
offer common carrier services directly to the
public. [Ill]
It was the "Balanced CML Option" that became the basis for
the proposed structure of the present SBS partnership.
In accordance with the Commission's decision, SBS was
formed with Aetna as the third party. In December of 1975,
SBS filed application for a DOMSAT system and after a year of
hearings, the FCC granted the SBS application in January 1977.
The Commission found the proposed SBS services to be
innovative and that further delay in the entry of SBS
into domestic satellite communications would disserve
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the public interest. To the extent that potential
anticompetitive concerns were raised by opponents,
the Commission decided that the conditions it was
imposing on SBS, together with its continuing
regulatory powers, were sufficient to insure that
no anticompetitive effects would occur from a
joint entry by IBM and COMSAT. [112]
In the spring of 1977, the FCC expanded the computer
inquiry into its second phase. Computer Inquiry II "sought to
determine whether a definitive boundary could be established
between communications services and equipment, which was
regulated by the Commission, and data processing services and
equipment, which were unregulated" [113] . With the increasing
convergence of communications and data processing, the FCC
saw a need for further clarification of the issues involved.
The realization that computer activities were no longer con-
fined to one physical location led the Commission to pro-
posing a revised definition covering all data processing
activities whether performed at one location or interconnected
in a major communications network. The decision handed down
in 1980 by the FCC in this inquiry basically stated:
1. A demarcation line should exist between "basic"
communications (narrowly defined as "the capacity
for the movement of information" or "pure trans-
mission") and "enhanced" communications, which
for all practical purposes includes all other
communications.
•
2. AT&T and GT&E (because of their obvious size) be
permitted to offer unregulated CPE (customer
premise equipment) and "enhanced" services only
through separate subsidiaries subject to a
number of safeguards, [114]
The FCC in October 1980 finally freed AT&T from its
regulatory constraints and placed the Bell System in direct
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competition with the computer industry. This landmark decision
will have a profound effect on the telecommunications and
data communications service for the country in the years to
come. This decision however, has met with immediate resistance
most notably from the American Newspaper Publishers Associa-
tion (ANPA) . As of this writing ANPA plans to file suit
challenging the FCC Computer Inquiry II Decision. The ANPA
plans to use the 1956 Consent Decree, which keeps AT&T out of
the unregulated services, as the basis for their appeal. How-
ever, AT&T is presently attempting to finalize a settlement
in its 6 year old antitrust case with the Department of Justice
which could change the 1956 Consent Decree. AT&T must conclude
the negotiations and have a final settlement by March 2, 1981
or the case goes to trial March 4, 1981.
2. DOMSAT Industry Performance
The influence of the computer industry (and the tele-
communications industry to a smaller extent) on the DOMSAT
industry played a vital part in determining the satellite
industry's performance in their present stage. The author
pointed out earlier that two of the most important criteria
for measuring the domestic satellite industry's performance
were: 1) product performance and technological progress, and
2) technical efficiency. The growth of the computer industry
as a result of its technological achievements and IBM's entry
into the field of satellite communications contributed signi-
ficantly to the "high marks" in the DOMSAT industry's performance
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Product performance was stated in Chapter III as "how
well the firms engaged design, determine the quality of, vary,
differentiate, and progressively improve their products—all
relative to that performance in these several regards which
would achieve the best attainable balance between buyer satis-
faction and the cost of production." The early stages of the
DOMSAT industry paralleled the telecommunications industry in
that there were essentially no standards by which product
performance could be measured. The pre-"Open Skies" Policy
era of the industry consisted solely of the COMSAT Corporation,
an organization that was established for the purpose of repre-
senting and promoting U.S. interests in a global communications
satellite system. Since COMSAT was considered the primary
reason for the "success" of INTELSAT, its effectiveness as
an organization rather than its product performance could be
a measure of industry performance in the first stage.
The introduction of competition in Stage II gave the
firms an opportunity to demonstrate product performance and
to make great strides in technological progress based on the
creativity and innovation of each individual firm. However,
the DOMSAT industry would have to receive "low marks" on pro-
duct performance if indeed it can be measured at all in this
stage because of one major consideration—cost. The firms in
the industry in the early years were faced with an incredibly
capital intensive product. Trying out new technological advances
in a satellite system not only entailed high technical and
111

operational risk for the company but enormous financial risks
as well. Many companies both large as well as small, were
not willing to take these sorts of risks. Consequently pro-
duct differentiation between the various satellite system were
slight and technological progress moved forward in small incre-
mental steps.
Although satellite costs have been constantly decreas-
ing all through the years, it was not until Stage III with
the influence of the computer industry technology (Mini and
micro computers, computer chips, etc.) and the computer indus-
try's utility of the satellite for data and information trans-
fer that telecommunications services provided via satellite
systems presented sufficiently attractive investment oppor-
tunities for many firms to enter the DOMSAT industry. The
drop in cost has helped to establish balance between buyer
satisfaction and cost of production. Also, with the satellite
the cost of transferring a bit of information dropped
significantly.
While there will be a steadily moving decrease in
the cost of land-based communications, the more
interesting trend is for cost of domestic satellite^
based transmission and for computer costs. These
trends will have reduced the cost for moving a
word or character or bit to almost nothing . . .
by the end of this decade. And with the era of
domestic satellites really just beginning, we can
anticipate still further technological developments.
[115]
With the introduction of digital data-transmission
services via satellite, many corporations are setting up
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nationwide data-communications networks with the intent of
competing directly for the business dollar [116] . Many firms
that offer satellite services are now very competitive and
making rapid technological progress in the area of capabili-
ties and functions they perform and the variety of services
they provide. A customer interested in satellite systems must
consider such things as: transmission, rate and speed of
transmission, availability of access, switching functions,
and other value added features [117] . An example of differ-
ences between satellite systems is illustrated by three satellite
systems that will become operational in the near future: SBS
,
the Advanced WESTAR (Western Union Space Communications, Inc.)
and AT&T's Scanning Beam satellite.
Table 8 shows a comparison of these three systems.
Besides the above features, the following are other charac-
teristics of the systems:
1. All three systems are intended primarily for
long-distance capability for the private internal
networks of very large organizations.
2. Among the participants, SBS is the only organi-
zation whose sole purpose is to provide domestic
U.S. end-to-end private network capability. By
selling transmission capabilities aboard its
satellites, the new system would give each sub-
scriber an independent communications network.
3. Two of the Advanced WESTAR satellites are
intended for the exclusive use of NASA in con-
nection with the space shuttle program and
only one satellite will be available for
commercial services.
4. AT&T's scanning-beam satellite system is con-
siderably more advanced than either SBS or the
Advanced WESTAR system but no commitment for
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An industry's market performance in the area of tech-
nical efficiency as discussed in Chapter II refers to "how
closely it approaches (or how far it misses) the goal of
supplying whatever output it produces at the minimum attainable
unit of cost of production." Because of the regulatory envir-
onment of the DOMSAT industry, technical efficiency of the
DOMSAT industry was difficult to measure. Again this is
similar to the development in the telecommunications industry.
As the industry became competitive, the firms had to find
ways to maintain a high degree of technical efficiency to re-
main a viable competitor and maintain a reasonable profit
margin. Technical efficiency therefore could be looked at
from the standpoint of various trade-offs in satellite design
depending on the goal or objective of the company.
The cost per channel per year is a measure of the
efficiency of a satellite, thus the number of years a satellite
will be operational is a satellite design consideration [119]
.
As Table II, Chapter IV reflects, the design life of the
INTELSAT system increased from 1.5 years to 10 years over a
span of 15 years. Although the design life of a satellite.
could be extended even further, say to 20 or 30 years, the
rapid change in satellite technology today would make a
satellite of that age very obsolete, uneconomical to operate
and undoubtedly technically inefficient. Until technology




Technical efficiency of production is also influenced
by the extent, if any, of excess capacity. In satellites,
capacity translates into the number of transponders and chan-
nels. "The number of channels a satellite can provide is re-
lated to the bandwidth available and to how the bandwidth is
used. The available bandwidth is related to the frequency
allocation" [120] . Presently, satellites are operating in
the 4/6 GHz (commercial) and 7/8 GHz (military) range which
allows up to 500 MHz utilization of bandwidth. The higher the
frequency that can be used, the more bandwidth that will be
available for use. There are experiments being conducted in
the 20-3 GHz range but the rain attenuation problem at these
frequencies make them unsuitable for use at this time.
"The number of channels may also be increased by
improving the efficiency with which a transponder is used"
[121] . One of the critical aspects of increasing transponder
efficiency lay in the development of the "sharing" techniques.
A large common carrier can utilize an entire
satellite for its traffic. To most non-common-
carrier organizations satellite capacity is far
in excess of their needs. Some organizations
can use a whole transponder. To many, even one
transponder has far too much capacity. The key
to their using the satellite is techniques for
sharing it. [122]
The sharing techniques have developed from a simple
multiplexing scheme to a more complex multiple access scheme
that is used in today's systems. A detailed technical des-
cription of each of the various sharing techniques is beyond
the scope of this thesis. However, to show how the degree of
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technical efficiency has increased in DOMSAT industry perform-
ance, the following is a brief description and/or definition
of the various sharing techniques that have evolved over the




A technique which permits more than one independent
signal to share one physical facility. In a satellite
a high level of multiplexing is needed so that many
signals can share the bandwidth. There are three
types of multiplexing:
1) Space Division Multiplexing
More than one physical transmission path are
grouped together. A satellite's capacity can be
shared by channels using the same frequency band
and time if it has directional antennas.
2) Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM)
Techniques for splitting up a single physical path
by frequency slices. With FDM a guard band is
needed between the frequencies used for separate
channels. Generally associated with analog signals
3) Time Division Multiplexing (TDM)
Technique for splitting up a single physical path
by a time slice. With TDM a time is needed to
separate the time slices. TDM is generally used
with digitial signals.
2. Multiple Access
In addition to simple multiplexing, this scheme will
permit many geographically dispersed earth stations to
share the satellite.
a) Demand-assigned multiple access (DAMA)
The capability to switch channels between multiple
access points on a demand basis. When traffic
fluctuates widely, fixed assignment of satellite
channels to separate geographical locations will
lead to inefficient utilization of the satellite
capacity. The satellite is sufficiently costly
that it is economic to use elaborate control
equipment to achieve DAMA.
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1) Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA)
Makes available a pool of frequencies and assigns
these on demand, to users. With FDMA, the
transponder bandwidth is divided into smaller
bandwidths. The first system for satellites to
use this technique was called SPADE (Single-
channel-per-carrier PCM multiple-Access Demand
assignment Equipment) . Designed for the INTELSAT
IV satellite the goals of SPADE were:
(1) To provide efficient service to light
traffic links.
(2) To handle overflow traffic from medium-
capacity preassigned links.
(3) To allow establishment of a communications
link from any earth station to any other
earth station within the same zone on
demand
.
(4) To utilize satellite capacity efficiently
by assigning circuits individually.
(5) To make optimum use of existing earth-station
equipment.
2) Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)
Makes available a stream of time slots and
assigns these, on demand, to users. FDMA was
used by satellites in the first half of the
1970 's. In the future the cost of high speed
digital equipment will drop and its reliability
improved. Given appropriate cost and reliability,
TDMA offers significant advantages over FDMA,
giving higher satellite throughput and greater
flexibility.
b) ALOHA channels
A form of demand-assignment time division multiple
access designed for interactive computer transmission.
The ALOHA system is a system for interconnecting
terminals and computers via satellites and terres-
trial radio links. It provides a form of trans-
mission discipline for interactive computing using
broadcast channels. ALOHA techniques are attrac-
tive for future satellite systems if these permit
large number of low-cost earth stations.
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D. STAGE IV: 1980 '3-2000 (Figure 19)
The telecoiranunications industry is rapidly moving into a
new stage where the socio-economical factors of our society
again play an important part in its development. The DOMSAT
industry is also moving into a new era, an era that parallels
the telecommunications industry. Of course, the same factors
from the external environment that impact the telecommunica-
tions industry are not lost on the DOMSAT industry. The in-
creased social consciousness and social awareness and the
introduction of satellites into everyday business will inevi-
tably effect the future market structures of the computer,
telecommunications and now the domestic satellite industry.
The merger of the computer and telecommunications industry
will be joined by the DOMSAT industry into the new Information
Management Industry. Such phrases as "Home Information Con-
cept," "Office of the Future," "switchboard in the sky," and
"pocket-phone" are already becoming a part of our daily
vocabulary. The Buck Rogers and Flash Gordon idealism of the
1930 's and 1940 's is a reality of today. The era of the
"society at home" has evolved.
While the inflation rate of the last year has driven up
the cost of living, i.e., food, housing, gas, etc., to an
outrageous level, the cost of satellite services continue to
decrease. This is a result of the decrease in the cost of
manufacturing satellites and satellite parts. "Since it costs















filled with traffic, incentives were offered to engender
interest in leasing circuits, or better still, entire trans-
ponders" [124]. Figure 20 shows the supply and demand for
U.S. domestic transponders at both the 4/6 GHz and 12/14 GHz
range. Implicit in this figure is the assumption that prices
will always continue to drop. The price of satellite usage
may drop even further when digital services are used exten-
sively throughout both the telecommunications and DOMSAT
industry. Satellite communications is becoming more and more
economical as businesses turn to its usage as a means of re-
ducing other costs.
Shortages of resources, particularly petroleum, will
focus attention on the social cost of transporta-
tion. Eventually, there will be pressure to use
teleconferencing to replace some air travel. In
the more distant future, telecommuting (from the
desk in the home to the national office via
satellite communications) may replace the daily
trip to work using the car or public transportation.
[125]
1. Teclmology Transfer of Satellite Communications
One area that will become an integral part of the
DOMSAT industry is the transfer of satellite technology to
other areas of our society. Technology transfer of satellite
communications to public service users is certainly not a new
idea, but a concept that has been somewhat slow in putting into
practice. The following discussion is about the evolution of
technology transfer of satellite communications and its future
direction
.
The advancement of various technologies in many fields
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the ability to adapt those technologies to practical or func-
tional uses has become a serious problem. A concept that
evolved from this problem is the management of "technology-
transfer." One definition of technology transfer is "the
process by which existing research is transferred operationally
into useful processes, products or programs that fulfill
actual or potential public or private needs" [126] . The
growth of satellite communications in the last two decades,
dramatically illustrates how the application of new technology
can benefit all segments of the society.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration was
established by the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958
to conduct research for the exploration of space in both manned
and unmanned vehicles [127] . To undertaJce this mission, giant
steps in technological and scientific achievement would have
to be made. In the 1958 Space Act, Congress specifically
tasked NASA with the obligation to "provide for the widest
practicable and appropriate dissemination of information con-
cerning its activities and the results thereof" [128] . To
accomplish this goal, the NASA Technology Utilization Program
was initiated in 19 62. The objectives of this program were:
1. Increase the return of the national investment
in aerospace research and development by encour-
aging additional uses of the knowledge gained
in those programs.
2. Shorten the time gap between the discovery of new
knowledge and its effective use in the marketplace.
3. Aid the movement of new knowledge across industry,
disciplinary and regional boundaries.
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4. Contribute to the knowledge of better means of
transferring new knowledge from its points of
origin to its points of potential use. [129]
From the 1964 launch of the "Early Bird" satellite
and through the 19 60 's, NASA took the lead in stimulating
private industry research and development in the field of
satellite communications through contracts, technical assistance
and other coordination efforts. In 197 3 however, the U.S.
Government decided to abandon its leadership role in satellite
communications research to pursue other technological endeavors.
In the years that followed, the private industry's role in
satellite communications R&D was modest at best. This was
due largely to the fact that large monetary investments were
required and the lack of a guarantee of success represented
a significant risk to a commerical organization [130] . But
as time and technology progressed, studies were conducted that
showed that satellite communications provided a viable means
of domestic communications. Consequently, several corpora-
tions filed license applications to the FCC for satellite sys-
tem authorization. After much delay and legal and political
red tape, the FCC authorized U.S. domestic satellites in the
1972 "Open Skies" Policy, and rapid development of U.S.
domestic satellite systems took place.
The development of satellite commiinications in the
U.S. was paralleled by development in other countries as well.
Canada was the first country to establish a domestic syn-
chronous-satellite communications system for the purpose of
reaching into all areas of its scattered population. Other
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countries such as Indonesia, Africa, Brazil, Saudia Arabia
and many European nations have turned to satellite communica-
tions to solve some of their communications problems. With
satellites well established as a media transmission for com-
munications ranging from telephones to high speed data trans-
fer for both commercial and military use, new frontiers are
being examined for transfer of satellite communications tech-
nology to other areas of public service.
Over the last five years, there has been growing con-
cern that the U.S. Government (NASA in particular) should re-
vise its 1973 decision and resume its satellite communications
R&D activities. The IEEE Board of Directors in 1977 was con-
cerned that the present communications satellite technology
was not being
adequately applied to enhance the quality of life
on earth. The U.S. Government should follow through
in its R&D investment to assume the transfer of
this technology to commercial use for public
services including improved health service at
lower cost, improved education, enhanced public
safety, and better news and entertainment
distribution. [131]
NASA's active role in this area was considered to be in the
public interest because:
1. Private industry cannot economically fill the void
left by U.S. Government abandonment of this role
in 1973.
2. Programs of other governments have proliferated
and show great promise.
3. Prior U.S. dominance in this technology is giving
way to reduced participation in this vast market.
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4. Prior technology is no longer being utilized to
benefit the quality of life in the U.S. and
among other societies of our planet.
5. Little technology is being developed. [132]
Over the last few years experiments have been con-
ducted to explore the use of satellites in the area of health,
education and other public services. It was discovered that
a strong organizational structure, and a total awareness or
indoctrination of the technology transfer process by those
involved, was needed in order for this technology transfer to
be successful. Mr. Witherspoon and Mr. Potter in their arti-
cle "Making It Happen: The Feasibility of Satellite Communi-
cations for Public Service," talk of the "missing link" in
the technology transfer process. The missing link in this
process "is not lack of money but inadequate organizational
mechanism ... If use is to be made of telecommunications
technology, it must be applied broadly and systematically"
[133]. With a clear understanding of the problem and in an
attempt to resolve some of those problems, the Public Service
Satellite Consortium was established in 1975. This consor-
tium consists of various consumer groups, educational institu-
tions and medical organizations. The fundamental mission of
this consortium is "to 'help its members render their respec-
tive services more effectively and at less cost. It will
attempt to minimize the period of transition between comple-
tion of a successful experiment and the commencement of opera-
tional services" [134] . Acting as an interface between the
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telecommunications industry (both commercial and private)
and potential public service users, the Consortium hopes to
direct and to accelerate the technology transfer process of
satellite communications into various areas of public ser-
vice. The strong potential use of satellite communications
in public service is largely based on the economics of cost-
savings. The rapid improvements of satellite communications
capability coupled with the entrance of many corporations
into the domestic satellite marketplace, has dramatically
reduced the cost of these services so that they are now an
economic viability for any institutions and organizations that
could not afford them in the past.
In 1979 the 1973 NASA decision was reexamined and an
assessment of its consequences on space technology R&D have
resulted in a new commitment to resume NASA's space communi-
cation activities. The new program goals are:
1. To enable growth in the capacity and effective
utilization of the finite and valuable re-
sources—the radiofrequency spectrum.
2. To develop technology focused on enabling overall
reduction in communication service costs.
3. To serve as a catalyst to the creation of the new
and innovative services for the public good. [135]
One of the major areas of satellite technology trans-
fer to public service users today is in health care and medi-
cal application. In Alaska, a group of health clinics was
able to use the ATS-6 (NASA's Advanced Technology Satellite)
system to assist in the treatment of remote village people—the
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satellite linked the clinic with distant professional hospi-
tal staff [136]. A goal of Dr. Whitlock, Professor and
Chairman, Department of Anatomy, University of Colorado Health
Science Center is to bring the latest medical technology to
as many rural communities as possible. "The economics of such
a system would make top physicians available to communities
that otherwise would never have the opportunity for such
service" [137]
.
The medical profession is just one example where the
application of satellite technology transfer can be utilized.
In the field of education, the potential for satellite ser-
vices seems unlimited from the video broadcasting of lectures
and programs in the classrooms to the use of public television
satellite systems in the home.
Among the various satellite systems now in development,
the one that displays an impressive growth potential is the
Direct Satellite Communication (DSC) system (now Joiown as
Direct Broadcast Satellite) . This system is characterized by
the use of small, inexpensive, earth station terminals—ter-
minals that could be located on, or close to, the user's premises
[138] . Because satellite communication costs are relatively
independent of geographic distance, all commercial satellite
systems potentially offer services that cannot be provided
by terrestrial communication facilities within a realistic
price. Because of the potentially inexpensive earth stations,
DBS systems ought to be just as useful to the institutions
of public service as they are for the individual.
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The technology transfer of the early NASA space tech-
nology has opened up a new era in telecommunications and
satellite communications that has unlimited potential for the
public good. The progress of this technology in recent years
has made possible national and even international participation
in virtually any broadcast including academic lectures in
many areas of study. With the ability to reach into every
corner of the earth, the technology transfer of satellite
communications has the potential to benefit everyone on the
surface of this earth.
2 . Direct Broadcast Satellites
In 1976, the FCC conducted what was reported as the
first direct satellite-to-home T.V. receiver tests and demon-
strated T.V. reception via CTS (Community Technology Satellite)
to numerous individuals [139]. The introduction of Direct
Broadcast Satellites (DBS) opens up a whole new arena of
possible services that can be provided to the customer either
on an individual basis or to a business firm for conducting
day to day business. What DBS essentially consists of is the
transmission of signals from earth to a satellite in geosta-
tionary orbit and the retransmission of those signals for
reception by small, inexpensive receiving antennas installed
at individual residences [140] . Considered in the area of
video programming, DBS will be competing for the same market
that is presently being served by other sources of video pro-
gramming. Those services consist of:
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1. CATV—Community Antenna T.V. (otherwise known as
Cable T.V.). This system was originally designed
to provide good signals to areas with poor over-
the-air reception. Inexpensive satellite pro-
grams distribution have made available a wide
variety of programming to CATV.
2. STV—Subscription T.V. Provides a scrambled over-
the-air signal with a descrambler for use at
subscriber's T.V. Programming is usually only
offered during prime time.
3. MDS—Multipoint Distribution Service. A similar
service to STV, MDS primarily serves hotels,
apartment buildings, and other commercial estab-
lishments. Although not originally intended for
home video delivery, this service is being pur-
chased increasingly by individual households.
4. Video cassettes and video discs. Involves a
video recorder or player attached to a regular
television receiver set to operate on an
unused channel. [141]
DBS essentially provides similar service and requires
the additional equipment that is attached to the television.
Also, like the other programming services, DBS will most likely
require paying some sort of subscription fee
.
The problem that providers of DBS will have to face
is whether consumers will be 'willing to pay for the service
and the cost of the equipment. Since DBS is essentially a
close substitute for the other services, the success of DBS
will depend on what value a potential customer will place on
having this particular kind of service. If a customer is
not willing to pay for the extra service of quality programming
that is provided now, he/she will most likely not place added
value or worth on having DBS services. Given the possible
paths that DBS could follow relative to whether there is value
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to the service or not, the structure of the DBS market faces
two important regulatory implications.
First, the more competition DBS faces from sub-
stitutes for its services, the more it will be
constrained to provide the services the public
wants at competitive prices and the less useful
regulation will be in protecting the public
interest.
Second, the more competition DBS faces, the smaller
its audiences and its revenues will be and the
greater the burden will be of any regulation im-
posed by the FCC. With greater competition,
regulation will be increasingly likely to raise
the cost of a DBS service sufficiently to deter
investment and prevent it from ever being
initiated. [142]
The problem that is faced by the FCC today is to
establish regulatory policies for DBS to ensure that it
serves the public interest. Since the Commission is respon-
sible for regulating industries that use the radiofrequency
spectrum, three classifications of regulatory models have been
defined to provide a model for DBS regulation: Broadcast,
Common Carrier and Private Radio services [14 3] . Appendix A
gives a description of those classifications and a proposed
model for DBS.
On October 29, 1980 the FCC released a Notice of Inquiry,
In the Matter of Inquiry into the Development of Regulatory
Policy in Regard to Direct Broadcast Satellite for the Period
Following the 19 83 Regional Administrative Radio Conference .
In the Inquiry, the Commission's aim was to pursue three goals:
1. Efficient use of the spectrum (including the




2. Opening new channels to allow an opportunity for
diversity of voices in order to further the goals
of the First Admendment.
3. Satisfaction of consumers' preference for
programming
.
The application of DBS opens up a pandora's box of
issues and problems that must be resolved before full scale
implementation can take place. The Notice of Inquiry issued
by the FCC poses a variety of questions and issues that should
be examined and commented on by interested parties before the
FCC rules on the DBS issue. The following are some questions
raised by the FCC on Direct Broadcast Satellites.
1. Will abundance of channels and competition among
program sources make regulation of program content,
types of service, and prices unnecessary?
2. Will DBS service institute a threat to any existing
sources of programming? What will be the cost and
benefits to the public?
3. Should the FCC set technical standards for DBS
systems?
4. What should the liability of a DBS operator be with
respect to the issue of copyright?
5. Relevant to the Communications Act, does it make
any difference that programming services are pro-
vided to the public on a subscription rather than
on a non-subscription basis?
6. If DBS operators were to offer direct-to-home pro-
gramming services on a non-subscription basis,
would there be any legal basis for distinguishing
such services from "broadcasting" as defined in
Section (o) of the Act?
7. Are there any legal consequences that flow from
the differences between the definition of "broad-
casting" in the Communications Act and the
definition of the "broadcast satellite service"
in the international radio regulations? [144]
132

Through the technology transfer of satellites to pub-
lic service users and the introduction of DBS into our lives,
it is clear that there will be drastic changes in our lifestyle
in the near future. Our changing social values and emphasis
towards the environment will mold and shape the DOMSAT indus-
try or the Information Management Industry of the future to
reflect the needs and wants of our society. The years ahead
promise some wonderful and exciting new applications of advances
made by the telecommunications, computer and domestic satellite
industries. How far will we advance in this field by the
year 2 000? The inventions, devices that emerge from the new
Information Management Industry that make our lives easier
will only be hampered by our own creativity and imagination.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The telecommunications industry from its initial beginnings
has shaped not only the courses of history but our society
as well. As fast as telecommunications was progressing, the
introduction of the satellite and its prominence as an indus-
try in just a few short years staggers the imagination. If
the telecommunications industry has gone through rapid changes
in technology, the satellite's phenomenal rate of technical
change has revolutionized our society, altered the patterns
of finance, politics, business and last but not least,
entertainment
.
Based on the study of Industrial Organization theory,
the author has presented a model of the domestic commercial
satellite industry as well as the telecommunications industry
with industry structure, conduct and performance as the under-
lying theme. The most critical aspect of the model, the driv-
ing force if you will, that sets the model in motion is the
external environmental factors. To demonstrate that this is
a dynamic instead of a static model of an industry, the author
has taken the reader through the historical events of the
telecommunications and domestic commercial satellite industry
emphasizing the ever-changing factors of the environment that
impact upon and change the industry. An interesting, perhaps
even imaginative, collation was the cyclical pattern of pre-
dominant influential factors that effected the telecommunications
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industry in its development. As a spin-off of the telecom-
munications industry, the DOMSAT industry has, so far, followed
similar stages of growth. This is not surprising however,
since both have their basis in the same technology and both
have the same and ultimate objective—better and improved
communications.
The introduction of the satellite launched the world into
the space age. Caught off guard by the launching of the
Soviet satellite, the U.S. raced to keep up with the Soviet
scientific achievement. Thus driven by the possible change
in the Soviet-U.S. relationship, the first stage was dominated
by the political and regulatory influences of Congress and
the FCC. The influence of NASA and the military on satellite
development, the enactment of the Communications Satellite Act
of 1962, the FCC docket concerning the establishment of domes-
tic satellite service and other legislative and policy deci-
sions during the 19 60 's gave the DOMSAT industry its struc-
ture. Because of the political and regulatory constraints,
very little advancement took place in the industry towards
development of a competitive, commercial satellite industry.
Indeed, regulation seemed to have kept the industry in check.
When the winds finally changed towards creating a differ-
ent environment for the industry, the 1972 "Open Skies" Policy
launched the domestic satellite industry into its second stage.
The competitive nature of the industry forced many new companies
entering the field to review and change their strategy to
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anticipate the future application of satellites to various
ranges of consumers. The firms in the satellite industry had
to keep on their toes in order to stay ahead of the competi-
tion if they had any designs of staying in the business at
all.
By the mid 1970 's, the DOMSAT industry was firmly planted
as a viable and exciting new industry with much to offer. As
a result the telecommunications industry (AT&T) now perceived
the DOMSAT industry as a threat to their environment. While
the telecommunications and DOMSAT industries were at odds with
each other, the DOMSAT industry was getting help from another
industry—the computer industry. The influences of computer
technology helped to put satellite services within reach of
many businesses and organizations that could not afford them
in the past. Even as computer technology helped the DOMSAT
industry, IBM looked to the satellite as a means of advancing
its own future and getting a piece of the pie that for so long
belonged to the telecommunications industry—data processing.
The end of the 1970 's and the beginning of the 1980 's saw
the boundary layer between the telecommunications, computer
and DOMSAT industries become muddled and almost undistinguish-
able. The changing social awareness in our country, the empha-
sis on conservation of our natural resources, getting back to
nature, rights of privacy and the First Amendment, the Free-
dom of Information Act, etc., are all areas having a direct
impact on the direction that the communications field will
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take in the future. The merging of the computer, telecommuni-
cations and satellite industry into the Information (Pro-
cessing) Management industry have some interesting ramifica-
tions for the near future. The advent of the home computer,
electronic fund transfers, teleconferencing, computer tutoring
of educational services, information of any kind available at
the touch of a button, etc., is upon us. With these informa-
tion processing techniques, the question that one must ask is,
what will be the tradeoffs? In a book written years ago,
George Orwell prophesized three fateful developments in our
communication system of the future:
First, technology would achieve the all-pervasive
information environment.
Second, words would be corrupted into blunt
instruments of persuasion;
finally, a mysterious controlling elite would
exploit these developments for enslavement rather
than for the enlightenment of man. [14 5]
It will be interesting to see what environmental factors
and influences will affect the new information management
industry. Perhaps socio-economic considerations or even the
political environment will take hold and shape the new indus-
try as suggested in the above quote. We may not have long to






1. Technical Standards .
a. FCC applies more detailed technical standards to
broadcasting than to any other category of
services
.
b. Three objectives are maintained: spectrum
management, ensuring compatibility of receiving
and transmitting equipment, and ensuring a
high quality signal.
2. Behavioral Regulations .
a. Broadcasters transmit information intended for
the public at large rather than for specific,
known recipients.
b. Broadcasters as public trustees are obligated
to provide public service to the community.
c. Broadcasters' public interest responsibilities
require them primarily to provide kinds of pro-
gramming that the Commission has determined to
be important, as well as programming to serve
the needs of the local community.
d. The FCC sets quantitative guidelines for broader
programming categories
.
e. Under the Fairness Doctrine, they must provide
adequate coverage of public affairs and must
: provide an opportunity for expression of all
points of view on issues they present.
3. Market Structure Regulations .
a. Restrictions on ownership of multiple broadcast
stations and on cross-ownership of broadcast
stations by owners of other communications media.
Restrictions apply at local, regional and national
levels
.
B. COMMON CARRIER REGULATIONS:
Common carriers are firms that offer for-hire conduits for
the transmission of information but have no influence over the
content of the transmissions. Services are available, with-
out discrimination, to all who are willing to pay the posted
prices for such services.
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1. Technical Regulations .
a. Primarily intended to conserve spectrum, and to
protect equipment (to prevent damage to the
network), employees and customers.





a. Focus on how common carriers set prices and
provide services to the public.
b. The FCC does not apply content regulation since
common carriers to not control message content.
c. The FCC determines maximum allowed rate of return
on the carrier's rate base.
3 Market Structure Rules .
a. Common carrier regulation until quite recently
implicitly assumed a monopolistic market structure
b. Common carriers are required to have separate
subsidiaries in instances where carriers have
desired to enter new markets.
C. PRIVATE RADIO REGULATIONS:
Private radio services include almost all users of the
spectrum over which the Commission has jurisdiction that fit
neither the broadcast nor the common carrier model.
1. Technical Regulations .
a. Technical regulation of this service beyond allo-
cation and assignment of frequencies is limited
to interference control.
b. The FCC regulates carrier frequency tolerance,
authorized bandwidth, maximum power, and types
of modulation.
2 Behavioral Rules .
a. Strictures on impermissable communications.
b. The FCC limits the ways in which various private
radio users can share frequencies and equipment.
c. Restrictions on how private service licensees
may interconnect mobile units with the public
land line telephone system.
3 . Market Structure Riiiles .
a. Regulations occur in only a few private radio
services
.
b. Prohibition on ownership of more than one trunked
land mobile system nationwide in the 800 MHz
band by a single equipment manufacturer.
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D. PROPOSED DBS MODEL:
1. Spectrum Allocation and Assignment .
a. The FCC will have to allocate frequencies between
DBS and other users in the broadcasting-satellite
band and assign specific frequency bands to
potential DBS operators.
2. Technical Regulations ,
a. The FCC will have to impose requirements pre-
venting out-of-band emissions on DBS operators.
b. To receive all DBS channels, receivers will have
to be compatible with signal in respect to fre-
quency, orbital location of satellite and wave-
form. The FCC must also decide whether the
benefits to viewers and system operators outweigh
the costs imposed.
3. Behavioral Regulations .
a. The FCC should establish a more efficient method
of choosing among mutually exclusive license
applicants, preferably by auction, but if not
by lottery or paper proceedings.
b. The FCC will have to decide on the rules concerning
program content.
c. The FCC will have to address rules concerning
prices or types of service offered.
4. Market Structure Rules .
a. Regulation of prices and service offerings, or
requiring operators to offer service to all on
equal terms, would serve no useful purpose in a
competitive market.
b. Necessary limitations on concentration of owner-
ship and control will depend on the ability of
the consumers to choose another source of pro-
gramming if one proves unsatisfactory, and thus
are the alternatives available in the market.
c. Since sources of information and opinion on issues
of public affairs include newspapers, magazines,
and radio broadcasting, the possibility of con-
sumers being denied access to points of view they
want to hear appears small. Thus, cross-ownership
restrictions seem to offer few benefits.
Source: FCC. Staff Report on: Policies for Regulation
of Direct Broadcast Satellites , Office of Plans
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